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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, a seventy-year-old woman named Rajo Devi Lohan and her husband Balla took $3000 in loans for in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments in Baddhu Patti, India, to conceive
their only child, Naveen, reportedly becoming the oldest mother
in history.1 When reports suggested Rajo was dying at age 72,
commentators quickly condemned her actions and the harm

1. World‟s Oldest New Mom Dying After IVF Pregnancy at Age 72, FOX
NEWS.COM (June 16, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/06/16/worlds
-oldest-new-mom-dying-ivf-pregnancy-age/.
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they would foist on her daughter, Naveen.2 Should India have
prohibited access to reproductive technologies beyond a certain
maternal (and/or paternal) age, as several other countries have
done?
This is but one among a series of pressing questions about
reproduction: Should the State permit anonymous sperm donation? Should brother-sister or first cousin-first cousin incest between adults be made criminal? Should the State fund abstinence education? What underlies all of these seemingly
disparate questions (and many others) is whether the State can
permissibly attempt to influence our decisions about whether,
when, and with whom to reproduce.
This turns out to be a question with far-reaching implications because such interventions take many forms, including
criminal sanctions (e.g., incest laws), bodily intrusions (e.g., the
sterilization of the institutionalized severely mentally retarded), the nonrecognition of certain types of contracts (e.g.,
the nonenforcement of surrogacy contracts in many states in
the United States), government subsidization of informational
programs (e.g., the funding of abstinence education), and the
regulation of businesses assisting in reproduction (e.g., the
U.K. law requiring that all sperm donors place identifying information in a registry available to donor-conceived children at
age eighteen).
One prominent type of justification given for these (and a
myriad of other) attempts to regulate reproduction is concern
for the best interests of the children that will result from reproduction (sometimes also referred to as child welfare analysis). For example, in the debate over whether the State or physicians should restrict access to reproductive technology for
unmarried individuals,3 both sides cite to copious empirical
literature on whether and to what extent children born into
single-parent families suffer compared to those born into twoparent families.4

2. Id.
3. See, e.g., N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 40
Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 642– 45 (Ct. App. 2006) (denying fertility services to a lesbian woman due to her sexuality, marital status, or both); Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 63–64 (2005).
4. See also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining
the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1022 (2003) (noting that studies showing advantages in
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This focus on the best interests of the resulting child is, on
the surface, quite understandable. In authorizing adoption, in
determining which parent should have custody upon divorce, in
determining when a child should be removed from its family of
origin and put into child protective services, and in countless
other areas of family law, the protection of the best interests of
existing children serves as a powerful organizing principle that
justifies state intervention.
While courts, legislatures, physicians, and commentators
frequently speak in a parallel idiom to justify state regulation
of reproduction, in this Article I show that such justifications
are problematic. Drawing on insights from bioethics and the
philosophy of identity relating to the so-called ―Non-Identity
Problem,‖ I show why this form of justification, at least as typically stated, is fallacious. Unless the State‘s failure to intervene
would foist upon the child a ―life not worth living,‖ any attempt
to alter whether, when, or with whom an individual reproduces
cannot be justified on the basis that harm will come to the resulting child, since but for that intervention the child would not
exist. To put the point in the language of distinctions I have
developed in earlier work,5 legislatures, judges, and scholars
problematically treat the reasons justifying state interference
with an individual‘s right to remain the legal parent of an existing child as fully overlapping with the reasons justifying state
interference with an individual‘s (potential) right to become a
genetic parent and bring a child into existence.
The best interests argument acts as a smoke screen that
prevents us from excavating the true justification for these

two-parent households ―have nothing to do with biology,‖ but instead are related to increased ―income, supervision, and parental attention‖); Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 861–65 (2005) (claiming that detriments to
offspring of having single parents persist even when income is controlled for).
Compare, e.g., Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Donor Insemination for Single Heterosexual and Lesbian Women: Issues Concerning the Welfare of the
Child, 9 HUM. REPROD. 1972, 1972 (1994), with Ethics Comm., Am. Soc‘y for
Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried
Persons, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1333, 1334 (2006), and Holly J. Harlow,
Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking
Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 173,
196–98 (1996).
5. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140– 41 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Constitution]; I.
Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115,
1122 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Genetic Parent].
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kinds of interventions. My larger project is to show a ―secret
ambition‖ of best interests reasoning, whose significance ―lies
not in what it says but in what it stops us from saying.‖6 That
is, the way the ―idiom takes the political charge out of contentious issues and deflects expressive contention away from the‖
law of reproduction.7 Because these regulations of reproduction
are often justified by appeals to child welfare, we should understand the dominance of that discourse as a palatable way of arguing for much more controversial (illiberal, eugenic, etc.)
ideas. While I am not claiming that there is an intentional
misrepresentation on the part of scholars, legislatures, etc.—
reliance on best interests of the resulting child (BIRC) reasoning may be the product of a failure to adequately reflect on the
issue, or what those disposed to psychoanalysis might call repression—I do view my project as an unmasking one wherein I
seek to reveal the real arguments that must stand behind these
policies if they are to be justified, and expose those arguments
to full scrutiny.8
This Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I by offering a framework that describes the dimensions of the regulation of reproduction. I show why best interests reasoning—a
justificatory idiom prominent in family law—seems from a political theory perspective to be a very appealing method of justifying government intervention in the reproductive area. I then
show the subtle error made when transposing these arguments
from the context of protecting already-existing children to the
question of government programs that affect who will come into
existence. Here I explain the Non-Identity Problem and show
its implicit acceptance in the jurisprudence rejecting the wrongful life tort.
In Part II, I show that a wide swath of state interventions
aimed at altering when, whether, and with whom we produce
6. I borrow the term ―secret ambition‖ from Dan Kahan‘s deployment of
it in respect to ―deterrence,‖ Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,
113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (1999), although the idea obviously predates
the term.
7. Id. at 417. More precisely, Kahan‘s claim is that ―the rhetoric of deterrence displaces an alternative expressive idiom that produces incessant illiberal conflict over status‖ such that ―[c]itizens of diverse commitments converge on the deterrence idiom to satisfy social norms against contentious
public moralizing; public officials likewise converge on it to minimize opposition to their preferred policy outcomes.‖ Id.
8. In this respect my approach differs from Kahan‘s, whose attitude toward the ―secret ambition‖ of deterrence is more mixed. Id. at 477–500.
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are nevertheless frequently justified (by courts, legislatures,
and scholars) on precisely the BIRC justification that the NonIdentity Problem suggests is problematic. I review examples of
the (mis)use of this reasoning to support policies such as abstinence education, the prohibition on brother-sister incest, the
barring of anonymity in sperm and egg donation, the preventing of reproductive technology access for single individuals, and
others. In so doing I introduce a new distinction between what I
call ―perfect‖ and ―imperfect‖ Non-Identity Problems, and show
that in the perfect cases BIRC justifications are a normative
nonstarter.
In Part III, I consider three attempts to reformulate the
BIRC justification in a way that is not self-defeating and can
support the types of interventions I have discussed in Part II.
The first attempts to expand the category of lives not worth living for which no Non-Identity Problem occurs. The second
draws a distinction between perfect and imperfect Non-Identity
Problems and suggests BIRC reasoning is only problematic for
the perfect cases. The third adapts a framework offered by philosophers for the wrongfulness of creating children with lives
not worth living that does not rely on BIRC-type reasoning by
appealing to what they call ―non-person-affecting principles‖
and ―same-number substitutions‖ of higher for lower welfare
persons. I show that each is problematic as a BIRC substitute
for a number of reasons. Finally, I briefly examine what significance these normative criticisms of BIRC and its three reformulations have for the constitutionality of these laws.
If BIRC and its reformulations fail, are these regulations of
reproduction wholly unjustified? In the conclusion, I briefly plot
four very different ways of justifying the regulation of reproduction on substitute theories relating to legal moralism, virtue
ethics, reproductive externalities, and wronging-while-overallbenefiting. Developing these theories and their problems is a
task I undertake in a companion paper that will come out in a
different issue of this Journal.9
If the argument I make here succeeds, it shows that a large
swath of the judicial, legislative, and academic discourse about
regulating reproduction is incoherent and that many regulations of reproduction are, based on the justifications given for
them and reasonable reformulations thereof, normatively and
9. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
Apr. 2012).
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(to a lesser extent) constitutionally problematic. Once BIRC
justifications are rejected, it becomes apparent that either
these forms of reproductive regulation are unjustified or quite
different sorts of justifications must be relied on, carrying disturbing illiberal or eugenic premises. My aim is nothing short
of re-writing our way of thinking about the regulation of
reproduction.
I. THE REGULATION OF REPRODUCTION AND THE
ATTRACTION OF (AND PROBLEM WITH) BEST
INTERESTS REASONING
In this Part, I set out a taxonomy of state interventions
aimed at influencing reproductive technology. I show that one
form of justification for intervention, what I call Best Interests
of the Resulting Child (BIRC) reasoning, has been transposed
from family law where its analogue, Best Interests of Existing
Children reasoning, serves as one of the organizing principles. I
show that it is an attractive kind of justificatory move, in political philosophical terms, because it marshals a particular kind
of third-party effect as a ground for limiting autonomous action: harm to a vulnerable third party to whom parents stand
in a fiduciary relationship—their child. I then demonstrate why
reasoning associated with the Non-Identity Problem makes this
transposition problematic. Finally, I show that my argument
has implicitly been accepted in one area of U.S. law: the rejection of wrongful life tort suits in almost every state.
All this serves as a prelude to showing in the next Part
that, despite this problem with BIRC justifications, a large
number of interventions that seek to influence whether, when,
and with whom we reproduce are indeed justified by courts,
legislatures, and scholars on exactly this problematic ground.
I should make clear up front that my starting point about
human reproduction is a modestly libertarian view; the State
has to offer some justification for limiting individuals‘ reproductive choices, although I am open to such justifications taking many different forms.10
10. While I think this is an intuitive and logical starting point that
matches the preconceived notions most of us have about our reproductive
lives, it is not the only possible one. We could instead hypothetically begin
with a view that individuals have no freedom to reproduce except in the cases
where the State grants them that privilege and start by asking whether a particular instance of reproduction is one that the State should justifiably permit.
That flip would certainly change things rhetorically, but the same intellectual
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A. THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF STATE INTERVENTIONS AIMED
AT INFLUENCING REPRODUCTION
I find it useful to describe State attempts to influence reproduction through a taxonomy with three dimensions I have
come up with, which I will return to throughout the Article.
The first dimension is the target reproductive decision (or
simply ―target‖ for short) the State seeks to influence. For our
purposes we can crudely distinguish three such targets: whether, when, and with whom individuals reproduce.11
Programs that sterilize the severely mentally ill or deny
access to reproductive technologies to those over age fifty affect
whether these individuals will reproduce. Abstinence education
aims to delay reproduction by teenagers or other unmarried individuals and thus influences when individuals reproduce. Prohibitions on brother-sister incest, programs aimed at carrier
screening for Tay-Sachs or other heritable genetic disorders,
and statutes barring sperm donor anonymity attempt to influence with whom individuals reproduce.
The second dimension goes to the means by which the State
seeks to influence the target decisions (―means‖ for short). These
interventions can roughly be ordered from strongest to weakest
in terms of their level of intrusion. Physical alteration is the
most intrusive, for example, sterilization of the severely mentally retarded. Criminal prohibition is also extremely intrusive,
for example, making it a crime to engage in brother-sister incest or to purchase surrogacy services. Less intrusively, the
State may make certain status determinations immutable (particularly as to parentage) and/or make contracts surrounding
reproduction unenforceable; for example, California treats gestational surrogacy contracts (where the surrogate carries the
fetus to term but does not contribute the egg for fertilization) as
enforceable but not traditional surrogacy contracts (where the
surrogate is both the genetic mother and carries the fetus to
term).12 More weakly, the State may also create default status
determinations and set the altering rules, for example, the older
problem would largely persist. Thus, while I offer my analysis here in the
more common frame, those who are attracted to the other frame can reverse
engineer what I say.
11. For other purposes, the ―how‖ dimension—for example, whether to
permit cloning as a form of reproduction—may also matter, but not for the examples I discuss.
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900–01 (Ct. App. 1994).

2011]

REGULATING REPRODUCTION

431

version of the Uniform Parentage Act still in place in many jurisdictions absolves a sperm donor of parental responsibilities
only if the recipient was married and the procedure was done
through a licensed physician, thereby setting conditions to
overcome a default parentage rule.13 Still less intrusively, the
State may selectively fund certain types of reproductive assistance—in the United States a number of states use state-level
insurance mandates to force insurers to cover IVF (an extremely expensive procedure), but use them selectively to fund only
particular types of reproduction through language limiting it to
married individuals, thus excluding single individuals and gays
and lesbians.14 An even less intrusive intervention is informational, for example, the State‘s funding of abstinence education
or public health campaigns encouraging carrier testing for TaySachs and other heritable genetic disorders.
The third dimension goes to the justification or, more often,
justifications that are, or could be, offered in favor of these interventions (―justification‖ for short). At a high and somewhat
crude level, it is useful to distinguish four different families of
justifications: (1) the Harm Principle, tracing back to John
Stuart Mill, suggesting that prevention of harm to others is a
justification for state action; (2) Paternalism, the argument
that the prevention of harm to the actor herself—usually calling on some conception of false consciousness or bounded rationality—is a justification for state action; (3) Wronging Without
Harming, the argument that preventing the wronging (usually
in a deontological sense) of another, even if one does not harm
him, is a justification for state action; finally, (4) Moralism and
Virtue, suggesting that though a particular action causes neither harm to the actor nor to third parties, its negative effects
on public morality generally or the virtue/character of individual actors is a justification for state action.15

13. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 377, 408 (1973).
14. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and
Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 536– 40 (2010).
15. Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM
TO OTHERS 26–27 (1984) (developing a much-fuller taxonomy of justifications
for criminal law interventions). The non-person-affecting principle approach I
discuss in Part III may actually fall between boxes of this taxonomy. As always, taxonomies are useful rough approximations of the world, but like maps,
they necessarily lose some of the details.
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For our purposes, it is useful to further subdivide the
Harm Principle form of justification to distinguish between
claims of harm to the children (the BIRC justification) and
claims of harm to other third-parties (a reproductive externalities justification I discuss toward the end of this Article).
The three dimensions and their elements are summarized
in Table 1 and can be used to describe many regulations of reproduction.
For example, abstinence education is aimed at influencing
when individuals reproduce (target), does so through information provision (means), and is typically justified based on a
Harm Principle rationale targeting the interests of the children
who will result from teenage pregnancy as well as legal moralism aimed at discouraging premarital sex (justification),
though other forms of justification are possible. Prohibitions on
sperm donor anonymity influence with whom individuals reproduce (target) through criminal prohibition (means) and are
typically justified through a Harm Principle rationale targeting
the interests of the children who will result (justification).
As is often the case in the fractal world of legal analysis,
things can thus get much more complex, but for present purposes these three dimensions are a useful starting point and I
will only add additional layers of complexity as needed.16 While
I have designed this taxonomy for this project and its aims, I
also think the taxonomy is very useful on its own.

16. To wit, I will add a fourth dimension relating to perfect and imperfect
Non-Identity Problems and I briefly discuss distinctions as to the severity of
the reproductive interests that are being stymied—for example, a governmental intervention that prevented you from having an eighth genetically related
child when you already had seven might be viewed quite differently than an
intervention that prevented you from having any genetically related children,
and short delays in the timing of reproduction might be thought of as less severe than longer ones. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Shaping Future Children: Parental Rights and Societal Interests, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 380 (2005); Cohen,
Genetic Parent, supra note 5, at 1194; Daniel Statman, The Right to Parenthood: An Argument for a Narrow Interpretation, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 224, 227–
228 (2003). One could also draw an additional prior distinction between State
attempts to influence the reproduction of others (the focus of this Article) versus attempts by other individuals (for example, charities offering voluntary
sterilization programs for poor women).
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B. THE PROMINENCE OF BEST INTERESTS REASONING IN FAMILY
LAW AND ITS ATTRACTION AS A JUSTIFICATORY MOVE
As the mapping in the prior Section suggests, the BIRC
form of justification for regulation of reproduction focuses on a
Millian Harm Principle17 and applies it to a particularly vulnerable group—children who result from reproduction. From a
political theory perspective, this idiom is a very attractive way
to justify state interference with reproductive decision making
because it justifies that interference for the sake of preventing
harm to society‘s most vulnerable, children.18 Harm Principle

17. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Albury Castell ed.,
F.S. Crofts & Co. 1947) (1859) (establishing the Millian Harm Principle).
18. To be precise, on at least some usages, what is called best interests
actually exceeds that which is prohibited by the Harm Principle. Richard F.
Storrow has captured a similar point nicely: ―although exposing children to
serious harm is of necessity inconsistent with their best interests, what is not
best for a child does not necessarily harm the child.‖ Richard F. Storrow, The
Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2300–01 (2007). Are
the types of cases I discuss in this Article harm prevention or benefit conferral? To ask the question demonstrates the baseline problem we face, a point I
return to in discussing enhancement below. Nevertheless, because my goal is
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arguments are typically accepted even by libertarians as a
proper justification for liberty-limiting government regulation,
including criminal sanctions. Further, with harm to children
arguments there are no issues of consent or contributory fault,
and as a matter of human psychology, the suffering of children
is a particularly potent call for action. Thus, BIRC is an attractive justificatory idiom because it relies on relatively uncontroversial premises that permit an overlapping consensus between
otherwise divergent comprehensive moral theories, such as welfarism, libertarianism, etc.19
BIRC is also an attractive justificatory idiom because it can
draw on a parallel idiom in family law as to the importance of
Best Interests of Existing Children, one of the central organizing principles of family law. Although it is sometimes called
child welfare or harm prevention, I will just use best interests
from here on out. This idiom has origins in the United States
going back to at least the 1830s.20 For example, in determining
child custody in a divorce proceeding, many states suggest that
the best interests of the child is to be considered, with thirtyfive states listing the welfare of the child as the sole consideration.21 Many state statutes have a presumption that the legal
to defeat the application of best interests reasoning in this context, I want to
be as generous as possible to my interlocutor. Therefore, for present purposes I
will grant that all interventions justified on BIRC reasoning that I discuss can
benefit from the political theoretical cover of the Harm Principle, even though
I think the point is arguable. As a terminological matter it might be more precise to describe the Harm Principle as a commitment to the view that harm to
others is the only basis for justifying the State‘s ability to limit liberty, but in
what follows I will speak more loosely about going ―beyond‖ the Harm Principle versus sticking to it.
19. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144 (rev. ed. 2005). Of
course, even the command ―protect children from harm‖ may not forge a complete overlapping consensus in that it may require subscription to particular
concepts of what constitutes ―harm,‖ for example, whether being born deaf
harms children or instead enables them to be a participant in deaf culture.
See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem,
and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 349–50 (2008). But the BIRC approach, if it was valid, would certainly be able to forge much more of an overlapping consensus than many of the views I canvass below.
20. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW
653 (2006) (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 241 (1985)); Lynne Marie
Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 340–50 (2008).
21. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children‟s Existing Rights in
State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
845, 907–11 (2003) (collecting statutes).
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parent will have visitation rights with the child even when they
are the noncustodial parent but that the court may terminate
those rights on a showing that the child‘s welfare would be seriously endangered.22 In adoption, the state investigates potential adopters, qualifying some and disqualifying others, to ensure that allowing the adoptive parents to become the parents
of the child is in the child‘s best interests.23 Despite constitutional law protecting parents‘ right to raise their child in their
faith, religiously motivated refusal of needed treatment for the
child will be overruled when the activity endangers a child‘s life
and in some jurisdictions if it endangers the child‘s health as
well.24
In these and other family law settings the central model is
the same: ―[t]he state appropriately steps in, as parens patriae
protector of the welfare of these nonautonomous persons, to act
in their behalf, choosing for them‖ when their welfare is threatened by parental action.25 From a political-theory perspective,
the best interests justification is a very powerful one, overruling what would otherwise be a forbidden state intrusion into
the private realm of family decision making.
One way of understanding the prominence of BIRC justifications for the regulation of reproduction, then, is as transposition of reasoning from family law into the law of reproduction.
The analogy goes: protecting the best interests of existing
children is to the constitutional protections against interference
in child rearing and legal parenthood (family autonomy) as protecting the best interests of resulting children is to the constitutional protections against interference in reproductive decisions (reproductive autonomy). Both are constitutionally
protected spheres where the state is usually restrained from in-

22. See id. at 933–34 (collecting statutes).
23. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-308(b) (2002) (mandating
court consideration of potential adoptive parents); Dwyer, supra note 21, at
882–904 (surveying existing adoption law by state).
24. See, e.g., Kei Robert Hirasawa, Note, Are Parents Acting in the Best
Interests of Their Children When They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their
Religious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 317–24 (2006) (collecting cases and
histories); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, “In God We Trust”: When Parents
Refuse Medical Treatment for Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 142 & n.79 (1993).
25. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States‟ Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 411
(2008).
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terfering but where such interference is nevertheless justified
in order to protect child welfare.
To be a little more precise, on the existing child side, U.S.
Supreme Court decisions like Meyer v. Nebraska,26 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 Prince v. Massachusetts,28 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder29 all recognize a broad family autonomy principle protecting parental-rearing decisions but also the need to subordinate family privacy when there are serious threats to child welfare. As is relevant for our purposes, the reason why the State
can permissibly interfere in parental decision making in order
to protect child welfare appears somewhat over-determined in
these family privacy cases. The predominant strand ties it to
child vulnerability: children are at the mercy of the parents,
walled off from the assistance of any other agents of protection
and socialization but for state intervention.30 This strand connects the protection of children to the protection of other vulnerable populations such as mentally incompetent adults, with
the State stepping in as parens patriae.31 There is, however, a
second strand present in these opinions in which protecting
child welfare is merely an instrumental good in ensuring future
citizens capable of participating in a democratic society. We can
call these two the ―vulnerability‖ and ―social planning‖ strands,
respectively. As to existing children, the two strands operate to
some extent in tandem in that the State intervenes to protect
children from, for example, an abusive home environment because the child is vulnerable and because failure to do so will
result in a child who cannot appropriately carry the mantle of
citizen. In the realm of regulating reproduction, however, the
two strands pull apart conceptually. I will argue that there is a
pervasive tendency to substitute the language of children‘s interest for what can really be justified only on the basis of societal interest.
26. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
27. 268 U.S. 510, 534 –35 (1925).
28. 321 U.S. 158, 165–66 (1944).
29. 406 U.S. 205, 221–22, 230–34 (1972).
30. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion
Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 415–16 (2008) (arguing that this jurisprudence reflects the Lockean premise that ―children are
self-evidently vulnerable, particularly relative to adults, and require special
solicitude and protection‖ and that ―[ p]arents have the first duty and first
right to shield their vulnerable children; if they fail, the state may intervene
on the children‘s behalf ‖).
31. Dwyer, supra note 25.
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C. THE PROBLEM WITH BEST INTERESTS
As I have said, there is a logical problem with attempts to
have best interests reasoning play a limiting role in reproductive autonomy analogous to its role limiting family autonomy.
The problem is that in the latter context there is an appeal to
the best interests of the existing child while in the reproductive
context the appeal is actually to best interests of the resulting
child. Whenever the proposed intervention will itself determine
whether or not a particular child will come into existence, best
interests arguments premised on that child‘s welfare are problematic.
This point is at the core of the ―Non-Identity Problem‖ developed by Derek Parfit, a problem that has been the subject of
a great deal of philosophical attention since the publication of
Parfit‘s Reasons and Persons in 1984.32 The punch line of the
problem is that we cannot be said to harm children by creating
them as long as we do not give them a life not worth living.33 I
will have more to say about the boundaries of the concept of a
―life not worth living‖ in Part III, but the basic idea is that it is
a life so full of pain and suffering and so devoid of anything
good that the individual would prefer never to have come into
existence.
The easiest version of the problem to see involves regulation of whether individuals reproduce, for example, the denials
of access to reproductive technology to gay, aged, or single parents. Imagine that sixty-year-old Ethel wants to have a baby
through reproductive technology and assume arguendo that
this child, Maxwell, will be worse off (physiologically, psycho-

32. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358–59 (rev. ed. 1987); see,
e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 224 (2000); Dan W. Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269 (1995); Dena S.
Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child‟s Right to an Open Future, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 12–13 (1997); James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986). For an in-depth treatment in the context of access
to reproductive technologies, see John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and
Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004). For
my own discussion of the problem in the context of tort liability for intentionally creating children with disabilities, see generally Cohen & Chen, supra
note 14.
33. This is sometimes also referred to as a ―life not worth living.‖ E.g.,
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 233; FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 98–104;
Seana V. Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 118 (1999).
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logically, etc.) than would the average child born to a woman in
her twenties. We cannot say that a state law preventing Ethel‘s
access to reproductive technology at her age furthers the welfare of Maxwell, because if the State blocks that access Maxwell will never exist and, so long as he has a life worth living,
coming into existence does not harm him. Thus, any state intervention influencing whether individuals reproduce (absent
lives not worth living)34 cannot be justified by BIRC reasoning.
A similar problem extends to attempts to influence when
and with whom individuals reproduce. Parfit‘s primary discussion of this problem in Reasons and Persons is that of a fourteen-year-old girl who has a child and gives it a bad start in life
by not waiting to have a child until she is older.35 Parfit states
that we tried and failed to persuade her on the grounds that it
is worse for her and for her resulting child, that the child would
have a bad start in life, and asks:
Were we right to claim that her decision was worse for her child? If
she had waited, this particular child would never have existed. And,
despite its bad start, his life is worth living. Suppose first that we do
not believe that causing to exist can benefit. We should ask, ‗If someone lives a life that is worth living, is this worse for this person than
if he had never existed?‘ Our answer must be No. Suppose next that
we believe that causing to exist can benefit. On this view, this girl‘s
decision benefits her child.
On both views, this girl‘s decision was not worse for her child.
When we see this, do we change our mind about this decision? Do we
cease to believe that it would have been better if this girl had waited,
so that she could give to her first child a better start in life? I continue
to have this belief, as do most of those who consider this case. But we
cannot defend this belief in the natural way that I suggested. We
cannot claim that this girl‘s decision was worse for her child. What is
the objection to her decision? This question arises because, in the different outcomes, different people would be born. I shall therefore call
this the Non-Identity Problem.36

Thus, here too the usual (what Parfit calls ―personaffecting‖)37 conception of harm of the BIRC argument cannot
be the basis for justifying attempts to alter when individuals
reproduce—such as state funding of teenage abstinence programs or implanting of Norplant or other temporary forms of
birth control in women convicted of multiple counts of drug

34. From here on in I stop repeating the proviso ―absent lives not worth
living‖ but intend it to be implied throughout.
35. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 358.
36. Id. at 358–59.
37. Id. at 393–95.
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possession.38 A similar logic applies to interventions regulating
with whom individuals reproduce, for example the criminalization of adult brother-sister incest in the United States and
many foreign countries.
At this juncture it is worth clarifying that none of this depends on any assumption that children are harmed if they are
not brought into existence. Instead, I share with others the
view that ―no one is harmed in not being created, because there
is no one to be harmed if we do not create someone . . . .‖39
Thus, accepting this insight in no way implies a conclusion that
parents do wrong by failing to have the largest number of
children they can or that they harm a particular child by failing
to create the child.40 All it entails is that no one is harmed by
being created if he or she is given a life worth living. I emphasize this point, because it is common source of confusion.
In one respect, the ―whether‖ case is an easier one for ruling out BIRC justifications than the ―with whom,‖ and especially the ―when‖ case. In these latter cases the claim depends on
the assumption that changing which sperm meets which egg,
that is changing which child genetically speaking is conceived,
is sufficient to produce a Non-Identity Problem that rules out
BIRC justifications. This is a relatively weak assumption. It
does not require subscription to a strong form of genetic essentialism—the view that your genes determine who you are—but
38. To be clear, in the cases discussed in this Article, the delay has to be
one as to when sperm and egg meet. Compare that to a different delay: a husband and wife fertilize pre-embryos as part of IVF at Time 1, but choose to implant the pre-embryo either at Time 1 + 1 year, or after cryopreservation at
Time 1 + 5 years. In many of Part II‘s examples, the regulation that influences
when and with whom we reproduce will also change other facets of an individual‘s life—like the date on which he or she is born or who his or her rearing
parents are—that might also be thought to alter identity in the relevant sense.
While I do not think these additional facts are necessary to produce a NonIdentity Problem (i.e., it is enough for a different sperm-egg combination to
occur), I leave open the question of whether they might nonetheless be sufficient to do so in some cases even if the same sperm meets the same egg. If they
were sufficient, a still-wider swath of the regulation of reproduction might be
subject to the Non-Identity Problem; for example, rules regarding the enforcement of pre-embryo disposition agreements that may alter when preembryos are implanted. See generally Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 5.
39. F. M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL‘Y 65, 72 (2000).
40. It is at least possible that this conclusion may be entailed by one of the
competitor views to BIRC as a justification for regulating reproduction, the
non-person-affecting principle approach, a matter I discuss below. See infra
Part III.C.
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is instead entirely compatible with the view that given a certain complement of genes you could become any number of different kinds of people from the point of view of what philosophers sometimes call ―narrative identity.‖41 Genetic identity
does not ensure narrative identity—identical twins share the
same genes but are different people. Thus, it is also not a claim
about identity and lack thereof in all senses of the word. It is
the weak claim that if we want to know whether the person
that results from the particular sperm and egg combination
would be harmed, we cannot say that it would further the welfare of that person if we instead substituted a different sperm
and egg combination. Philosophers often refer to this as ―numerical identity,‖ two entities are not the same because there
are two of them.42
To put it tangibly: my mother was married once, without
children, before she had me with her second husband. Imagine
we concluded (counterfactually I hope!) that on the day of my
conception she had instead conceived with her first husband
the resulting child—call him Gabriel—who would have been
healthier or in other ways had a better life than I did. All the
Non-Identity Problem requires accepting is that if we want to
know whether my life harms me (i.e., is Glenn harmed) it
would be wrong to compare Glenn‘s life to the life Gabriel
would have had. That comparison might be relevant for some
other purposes—indeed the non-person-affecting principle approach I discuss in Part III focuses on it—but is not relevant to
the question of whether Glenn has been harmed by being born.
For that question the correct comparison is Glenn‘s life versus
Glenn‘s nonexistence, not Glenn‘s life versus Gabriel‘s. I believe
Parfit is right on this issue of alterations of ―when‖ or ―with
41. David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, THE STANFORD ENPHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/identity-ethics/.
42. Harold Noonan, Identity, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., rev. ed. 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
entries/identity/ (―To say that things are identical is to say that they are the
same. ‗Identity‘ and ‗sameness‘ mean the same; their meanings are identical.
However, they have more than one meaning. A distinction is customarily
drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with
qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they
share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that,
but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical
identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself.‖).
CYCLOPEDIA OF
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whom‖ we reproduce, and in what follows I will examine the
consequences for the law.43
I have also purposefully restricted my canvas in this Article to cases where the State seeks to influence who will be
conceived not who will be born to bracket (for present purposes)
three additional more controversial questions. The first question concerns whether Non-Identity Problems can result from
genetic manipulations of early embryos, and which kinds of
manipulations—an issue I have discussed in other work concerning tort liability for parents who use reproductive technologies to purposefully create children with disabilities; these
cases raise the further question of whether genetic manipulations rather than changing conception can give rise to NonIdentity Problems.44 The second question concerns the interplay between Non-Identity Problems and the abortion right, a
case I believe requires a quite different analysis: On the one
hand, while no one is harmed if not conceived, on some views of
fetal personhood the fetus may be harmed if aborted, creating a
divergence from my cases. On the other hand, for some writers
that defend the abortion right as a right not to be a gestational
parent that is tied to bodily integrity, that right exists irrespective of fetal person such that this divergence may be irrelevant.45 Thus, my analysis here does not necessarily cut in any
direction on the abortion debate, except to render more problematic a small strand of reasoning occasionally presented that
parallels BIRC by defending the abortion right on the basis of
harm to children of growing up unwanted or out-of-wedlock.46

43. For those who are not unpersuaded, the analysis of regulations that
cover many of the interventions in Part II on ―whether‖ individuals reproduce
should still be relevant, since it does not rely on this tie between genes and
identity. How the Non-Identity Problem interfaces with religious views of ensoulment I leave to religious scholars and self-consciously do not address here.
44. In a symposium issue in which we both participated, Kirsten Smolensky argued that such manipulations can never create Non-Identity Problems, Kristen Smolensky, Creating Children With Disabilities: Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299,
331–36 (2008), while I argued against that conclusion, Cohen, supra note 19,
at 350–59.
45. See, e.g., Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 5, at 1132; Judith Jarvis
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48– 49 (1971) (grounding a defense of abortion in the thought experiment of waking up one morning to find a world-famous violinist connected to your vital organs without
your permission).
46. That strand is one way to read the passage in Roe v. Wade noting that
―[t]here is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
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The third question relates to regulation of multiple gestation,
made (in)famous by the ―octomom‖ news coverage.47 Whether
Non-Identity Problems occur here might depend on how multiple gestation came about (e.g., multiple implantation versus
fertility drug use) and whether Non-Identity Problems occur
with harms to already-existing pre-embryos. There are many
complications here—indeed one might conclude that some of
the multiple gestating pre-embryos are harmed while others
are not48—but for this Article I stick to simpler cases which, as
we will see, are not nearly as simple as they might appear.
D. AN ANALOGY TO WRONGFUL LIFE CASES
At this juncture some readers might react: ―That is philosophically interesting, but it seems like an intriguing puzzle
that would never motivate judges or other legal actors.‖ To the
contrary, there is an area of law where courts and legislatures
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.‖ 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
47. Randall C. Archibold, Octuplets, 6 Siblings, and Many Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/us/04octuplets.html?
ref=nadyasuleman.
48. To hum only the first few bars of a very complex set of questions: first
imagine a woman is deciding how many of six pre-embryos to implant at once.
If we knew that the prevailing legal rule would cause her to implant all six at
once or each of the six seriatim, one might not think there is a Non-Identity
Problem since the same six (genetically speaking) children will come into existence, the only question is whether they will suffer the deficits of womb sharing or not. Even this conclusion will depend on the issue alluded to above, supra note 38, of whether changes in sperm-egg combination are only sufficient
or actually necessary to produce a Non-Identity Problem. Contrast this with a
case where which of two legal rules was adopted to regulate multiple gestation
will cause the prospective mother to either implant all six at once, or only implant two pre-embryos seriatim (due to cost or some other reason). Now there
is no Non-Identity Problem as to the two, because the two would have been
implanted either way, but there may be a Non-Identity Problem as to the four
whose implantation depends on the prevailing legal rule. Actually, on some
views about whether fertilized pre-embryos are the kinds of things that are
harmed by not being implanted, the answer here might depend on whether the
prevailing legal rule alters how many pre-embryos are implanted versus how
many are fertilized to begin with. Finally, contrast these two cases with still
another case where multiple gestation occurs due to the use of a fertility drug,
and but-for the use of the fertility drug all the fetuses that come into being
would be the result of different sperm-egg combinations—here it seems as
though the Non-Identity Problem affects all of the fetuses and thus the claim
that the fertility drug should be banned due to harm to these children. This is
merely a taste of the complexities involved in reasoning about the NonIdentity Problem in the multiple gestation context, one of the reasons I put it
to the side in this Article since it deserves its own separate analysis elsewhere.
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have implicitly paid attention to insights akin to those of the
Non-Identity Problem: wrongful life tort suits. Thus, even a
judge or scholar uninterested in the philosophical soundness of
the BIRC justification should be troubled by the doctrinal rejection of the equivalent argument in a cognate area of law.
Although the nomenclature is somewhat fluid, ―wrongful
birth‖ suits are typically brought by parents of an unhealthy
(but planned for) child against the medical professional who
performed a genetic test on them or the fetus, or the one who
interpreted the test or informed them of the results. The claim
is that the professional behaved negligently, and but-for that
negligence (i.e., had the parents received the proper results) the
parents would have avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy.49 By contrast, in a ―wrongful life‖ suit the child that results brings action as him or herself under similar circumstances, with the claim being that ―the operable injury is the
child‘s life itself, with nonexistence identified as the preferred
alternative.‖50
Only tort liability in wrongful life cases would run afoul of
the Non-Identity Problem because (assuming they are given a
life worth living) the children born cannot be said to be harmed
by their conception, for had their parents been properly informed of the risk of their health difficulties and delayed conception or chosen a different reproductive partner, they would
not have come into existence; instead a different child would
have. In a wrongful birth case the parents claim that they have
been harmed, not that the child has been, so no Non-Identity
Problem arises. While they seldom speak in philosophical
terms, this key insight of the Non-Identity Problem has been
implicitly accepted by the federal courts and the vast majority
of state courts when they reject wrongful life torts.51

49. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill.
1987) (Hemophilia B); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 ( Mass. 1990) (anhidrotic ectodermal dysplasia). For a listing of leading cases by jurisdiction, see
Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 114, 160 n.141 (2005).
50. E.g., Hensel, supra note 49, at 143. Both can be contrasted with
―wrongful pregnancy‖ or ―wrongful conception‖ cases, in which parents sue for
the birth of a healthy but unplanned for child, often the result of a negligently
performed tubal ligation or other procedure aimed at blocking reproduction.
E.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ohio 2000); Hensel, supra
note 49, at 151 n.53, 152–53 & 153 n.61.
51. Hensel, supra note 49, at 161 (noting only three U.S. states permit
wrongful life suits with the rest rejecting them).
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Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, for example, involved a Mother who sought genetic counseling regarding her
first trimester fetus due to the existence of other children in the
family with Hemophilia.52 She told the doctor she would seek
an abortion if the child was likely to be a hemophiliac, but due
to a misdiagnosis ended up giving birth to a child with Hemophilia B and brought actions for wrongful life and wrongful
birth.53 While the Illinois Supreme Court permitted the wrongful birth cause of action to go forward it rejected the wrongful
life action, sharing with other courts ―the belief that human
life, no matter how burdened, is, as a matter of law, always preferable to nonlife,‖ and thus it was ―reluctant to find that the
infant ha[d] suffered a legally cognizable injury by being born
with a congenital or genetic impairment as opposed to not being born at all.‖54 In chiding the lower court for analogizing to
an ordinary prenatal injury claim, the court noted that in those
cases ―if the defendant had not been negligent, then the child
would have been born healthy.‖55 By contrast,
[r]ecognition of a cause of action for wrongful life in this case
would . . . require this court to find [the child] had an interest in
avoiding his own birth, i.e., that there is a fundamental legal right
not to be born when birth would necessarily entail a life of hardship,56

and the court reasoned that ―[s]uch a finding, however, would
essentially require us to possess the divine ability to determine
what defects should prevent an embryo from being allowed life
so that denial of the opportunity to terminate the existence of
such a defective child in embryo supports a cause of action.‖57
This last line amounts to a recognition both that the NonIdentity Problem poses no obstacle for a case involving a child
on whom there has been conferred a life not worth living, along
with a judicial reluctance to identify what lives fall into that
category (where liability would be appropriate).
Similarly in Nelson v. Krusen, the Texas Supreme Court
rejected wrongful life liability in a claim involving a negligent

52. 512 N.E.2d at 693–95.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 697 (citations omitted); see id. at 703–07 (allowing the parents‘
wrongful birth action to move forward).
55. Id. at 698.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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failure to diagnose the genetic mother as a carrier of Duchenne
muscular dystrophy.58 The court held:
In this, as in all wrongful life cases, however, there is no allegation
that but for the defendant‘s negligence the child would have had a
healthy, unimpaired life. Instead, the claim is that without the doctor‘s negligence the plaintiff never would have been born. Thus, the
cause of action unavoidably involves the relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed to no life at all. All courts, even the ones recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life, have admitted that this calculation is impossible. . . . [T]his is not just a case in which the
damages evade precise measurement. Here, it is impossible to rationally decide whether the plaintiff has been damaged at all. 59

Thus the key insight of the Non-Identity Problem has already been recognized by courts and the problem is not merely
of philosophical interest, but one that is already part of our jurisprudence.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF BEST INTERESTS: SOME
EXAMPLES FROM LEGISLATURES, COURTS, AND
SCHOLARS
Given the logic of the Non-Identity Problem and the acceptance of the implications of the problem by courts in the wrongful life context, one might expect legal scholars, judges, and legislators to avoid making BIRC arguments for attempts to
influence, when, whether, and with whom we reproduce. Indeed, the idea I have presented hopefully now seems so clearly
correct that you might find it hard to believe that this error is
widespread. Strikingly, as I show in this Part, this reasoning
appears to persist in a wide swath of cases. On some occasions
it is the primary justification for the policy offered, while in
others it is one justification among others (for example, alongside Paternalism and Commodification concerns in the regulation of surrogacy agreements). I say ―appears‖ quite deliberately because all texts are somewhat ambiguous. While the most
natural reading of these sources seems to me the invocation of
the BIRC argument, it is at least possible that in some instances the argument is instead shorthand for one of the three
arguments I discuss in Part III (particularly the non-personaffecting principle approach). It is also possible that this ambiguity represents the dressing up of controversial premises in a
palatable idiom.

58. 678 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1984).
59. Id. at 925.
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My ambition here is not psychoanalytic. I do not purport to
delve into the minds of these players and show what they ―really‖ were thinking, or suggest that they are trying to obfuscate.
Instead, I will merely suggest that if these sources are really
making BIRC arguments (my own view of the matter) then
what I say in this and the preceding Part shows why it is unworkable. If instead they unintentionally or deliberately are using BIRC-like language as shorthand for one of the reformulated justifications discussed in Part III, then my analysis of
those justifications will show why that too is problematic.
In this Part, I discuss six examples of cases where courts,
legislatures, and legal scholars employ BIRC rhetoric to defend
policies that influence when, whether, and with whom we reproduce.60 In reviewing the use of BIRC-reasoning in my six illustrations, I divide them into two categories for which the
Non-Identity Problem has subtly different implications that I
call ―perfect‖ and ―imperfect‖ Non-Identity Problems. I further
develop the possible significance of this distinction in the next
Part.
A. PERFECT NON-IDENTITY PROBLEMS
For ―perfect‖ Non-Identity Problems—for example, prohibitions on incest or access to reproductive technologies—state action restricting reproduction can never be justified by recourse
to BIRC-reasoning because doing so is self-contradictory: the
policy, if effective, will necessarily alter when, whether, and
with whom one reproduces, thereby creating a Non-Identity
Problem. Classification as a ―perfect Non-Identity Problem‖ is
not dependent on the policy‘s aim to alter when, whether, and
with whom we reproduce but instead what will happen if the
policy is successful. Thus, a policy could have an aim entirely
divorced from the purpose of altering individuals‘ reproductive
choices, and yet, to the extent its success will have that effect,
BIRC justifications for the intervention are problematic.

60. These examples are not exhaustive, but nicely cover both natural and
artificial reproduction as well as different means of regulation. Other good examples might include the denial of reproductive technology access to the disabled, see, Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17 (2002), and restrictions on procreation by incarcerated felons, see Carter Dillard, Child Welfare
and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367, 391 (2009).
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1. Criminal Prohibition of Adult Brother-Sister and First
Cousin-First Cousin Incest
Brother-sister incest between adults remains illegal in
many states in the United States.61 Sex between first cousins is
illegal in eight states, while marriage between them is illegal in
twenty-five.62 The ―most commonly cited rationale for prohibiting consensual relations is that incestuous relationships have
the potential to create children with genetic problems if the
parties reproduce,‖63 potentially a perfect illustration of BIRC
justification.64 Courts in the United States have upheld these
statutes on this basis, as has a recent case in England upholding a similar prohibition, even in cases where siblings adopted
into different families subsequently married each other.65
Sophisticated scholars have assumed the validity of BIRC
arguments against incest. In a recent article examining the
risk of ―incest‖ with sperm and egg donation in the U.S., Naomi
Cahn argues that ―[t]he higher rate of genetic abnormalities in
consanguineous relationships‖ provides ―a partial justification
for the incest prohibition.‖66 In incestuous couplings there is an
increased likelihood that both partners will carry the same re-

61. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW, § 3-323 (LexisNexis 2002). Interestingly, brother-sister incest is not a
crime in Rhode Island, Ohio, and New Jersey. Jennifer Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327, 1343 & n.83 (2008).
62. Collins et al., supra note 61, at 1344. While BIRC arguments as to
parent-child incest also run afoul of the Non-Identity Problem, it seems to me
that in these cases the justification for regulation is much more obviously concerns about coercion in this relationship rather than BIRC.
63. Id. at 1391.
64. Of course, as I emphasize below, it is possible to recast these concerns
not as BIRC but as non-person-affecting principle or externality justifications,
although in context I read them more clearly as BIRC ones.
65. Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 –65 (Colo. 1978) (upholding a prohibition on the marriage of adopted siblings while striking down a prohibition on
marriage between adopted siblings reasoning that only as between genetically
related siblings is ―[t]he physical detriment to the offspring of persons related
by blood . . . totally absent‖) (quoting 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 183
(1931)); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (relying on
the prevention of the ―genetic mutation‖ of children born from incest as one of
the reasons to uphold criminal prohibitions against constitutional challenge);
State v. Allen M. (In re Tiffany Nicole M.), 571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997) (similar); Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—or the Curtain?—for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 61, 85–87
(2009) (noting an English case and presenting genetic justifications for
prohibition).
66. Cahn, supra note 65, at 86.
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cessive gene, thus increasing the likelihood of genetic abnormalities from a two to three percent risk rate of severe abnormalities in non-consanguineous relationships to between thirtyone and forty-four percent for siblings, with the most common
abnormalities being congenital malformation, learning difficulties, blindness, hearing impairment, metabolic disorders, cystic
fibrosis, and hemoglobin disorders.67 Given that the ―risk of
harm to future offspring is palpable and certain (although most
such offspring will not experience these abnormalities),‖ Cahn
concludes, ―we might decide it is appropriate, based on potential harm, to police certain relationships,‖ and she recommends
―allow[ing] incestuous relationships [only] between relatives
who are incapable of procreating, or . . . requir[ing] genetic testing in the case of pregnancy.‖68 Many other scholars make similar arguments supporting the incest prohibitions.69
To be sure, like Cahn, many of these authors critique existing laws as overinclusive in the scope of their prohibitions to be
justified on the basis of the genetic harm argument. However,
even if the prohibition was restricted to cases where there is a
very substantial chance of genetic abnormalities, unless those
abnormalities were severe enough to give the child a life not
worth living, BIRC-type arguments in favor of the incest prohibition are irrational: if the parents of a child born of incest had
complied with the law and instead had other reproductive
partners, a different child would come into existence.
67. See, e.g., id. at 85–87; Bernadette Modell & Aamra Darr, Genetic
Counselling and Customary Consanguineous Marriage, 3 NATURE REVIEWS
GENETICS 225 (2002).
68. Cahn, supra note 65, at 86–87 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2005)
(noting that, while ―what could very well be deemed offensive, and thus legally
prohibited, [about incest] is the fact that parents might put their future progeny in harm‘s way by increasing the risk that they will be born with such [recessive genetic] traits,‖ such a rationale is problematically underinclusive because we fail to criminalize other parents who do the same); Clare Chambers,
Inclusivity and the Constitution of the Family, 22 CANADIAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE. 135, 144 (2009) (―[ I ]ncest is wrong to the extent that it harms
non-consenting others and undermines the maintenance of society over time,
in both cases by producing children with vulnerable genetic compositions.‖);
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 971, 998 (2006) (―As for consensual incest, even under [John
Stuart] Mill‘s [Harm] principle it can justifiably be prohibited because it poses
a significant risk of causing serious genetic harm to the children conceived
thereby.‖).
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2. Abstinence Education/Funding
Since 1982, the U.S. government has spent over $1.5 billion to promote abstinence-only education programs through
the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), the Maternal and Child
Health Services Block Grant (Title V of the Social Security
Act), and the Special Programs of Regional and National Significance Community-Based Abstinence Education Program
(CBAE).70 To qualify for funding under either Title V or the
CBAE block grants, programs must meet a number of content
requirements, including that the program mandates that the
curriculum inter alia ―teaches that bearing children out-ofwedlock is likely to have harmful consequences for the child,‖71
a BIRC claim. In passing the CBAE statute, Congress relied in
part on BIRC-type reasoning noting in its findings that the
children of teenage mothers had ―a higher incidence of low
birth weight babies‖ and higher infant morbidity.72
BIRC justifications focused on social detriments experienced by the resulting children also feature prominently in
conservative commentators‘ support for these kinds of programs, as reports issued by the Heritage Foundation demonstrate. One such report authored by Patrick F. Fagan titled
How Broken Families Rob Children of Their Chances for Future
Prosperity proclaims that the children of ―teenage mothers who
give birth outside of marriage . . . spend more time in poverty
than do the children of any other family structure.‖73 The report then catalogues a series of alleged harms to these children
including that these children
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to z-10 (2006); Social Security Act, Title V, 42 U.S.C.
§ 710 (1935), amended by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104 -193, § 912 110 Stat. 2354 (1996);
DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, COMMUNITY-BASED ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAM FUNDING OPPORTUNITY
2008, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/pdf/HHS-2008-ACF-ACYF-AE
-0099.pdf; see Bonnie Scott Jones & Michelle Movahad, Lesson One: Your
Gender is Your Destiny—The Constitutionality of Teaching Sex Stereotypes in
Abstinence-Only Programs, AM. CONST. SOC‘Y FOR L. & POL‘Y, Sept. 2008, at 1,
3, available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Jones_-_Movahed_Issue_
Brief.pdf.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2); Jones & Movahad, supra note 70, at 4.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (a)(5).
73. Patrick F. Fagan, How Broken Families Rob Children of Their
Chances for Future Prosperity, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Found., D.C.), June 11, 1999, at 10–11, available at http://www
.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1999/06/Broken-Families-Rob-Children-of-Their
-Chances-for-Future-Prosperity.
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miss more days of school, have lower educational aspirations, receive
lower grades, and eventually divorce more often as adults . . . . [a]re
almost twice as likely to exhibit antisocial behavior as adults; twentyfive percent to fifty percent more likely to manifest such behavioral
problems as anxiety, depression, hyperactivity, or dependence; two to
three times more likely to need psychiatric care; and much more likely to commit suicide as teenagers.74

Because these programs explicitly attempt to alter when
teenagers reproduce (after marriage or, after adolescence), such
programs cannot be justified out of concern for the children who
will result if teenagers do not wait; waiting means that those
children never come into existence, instead other children do.
3. Reproductive Technology Access Restrictions, Parental
Fitness Screening, and the Adoption Analogy
A number of countries restrict access to reproductive technologies on the basis of age, marital status, or sexual orientation and justify it through BIRC reasoning. Such arguments
are incoherent based on a perfect Non-Identity Problem.
Italy‘s Law 40 confines use of reproductive technologies to
infertile women of ―potentially fertile age‖ who are married or
part of a ―stable‖ heterosexual couple, and indirectly burdens
LGBT Assistive Reproductive Technology (ART) users by prohibiting the use of donated sperm or eggs.75 The BIRC-roots of
the legislation are evident in the Italian Parliamentary Commission for Social Affairs‘ review of the then-proposed legislation expressing concern with ―avoiding psycho-social damage to
the child, which can result from parenting models which are
not socially consolidated.‖76 a view also espoused by more recent Italian governments.77 The Australian states of Western
74. Id. at 11; see also, e.g., Robert E. Rector et al., Marriage: Still the Safest
Place For Women and Children, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Found., D.C.) Mar. 9, 2004 (claiming that children of divorce or nevermarried mothers are far more ―likely to suffer from child abuse than are children
raised by both biological parents in marriage‖), available at http://www.heritage
.org/research/reports/2004/03/marriage-still-the-safest-place-for-women-andchildren.
75. See Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women‟s Rights:
The New Italian Law On Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 73,
(2006).
76. Id. at 88. Article I of the law itself provides the act‘s guiding principle:
―recourse to medically assisted reproduction is permitted only in conformity
with this statute and the rights of all those involved, including those of the
concepito, or unborn child, are said to be ensured.‖ Id. at 83.
77. Id. at 83, 88, 89 (citing recent Department of Health Consultation Paper proclaiming that ―[a]s a general rule the Government believes that it is
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Australia, South Australia and Victoria have all enacted similar legislation forbidding access to ART by LGBT and single individuals and permitting use only where the reason for infertility is not age; the statutes explicitly adopt BIRC language.78
The Western Australian version requires ―that the prospective
welfare of any child to be born consequent upon a procedure to
which this Act relates is properly taken into consideration.‖79
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) of 1990 specifies that ―a woman shall not
be provided with treatment services unless account has been
taken of the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of
the treatment (including the need of that child for a father).‖80
The HFEA Act of 2008 recently liberalized that policy by substituting ―supportive parenting‖ for ―a father‖ in the parenthetical after legislators decided that the requirement discriminated against single mothers and lesbians;81 however, the
―duty . . . to consider the welfare of any child who may be born
as a result of the treatment . . . , and of any other child who
may be affected‖ has been retained.82 France‘s 1994 law regulating reproductive technologies confines ART access to ―heterosexual couples who . . . are married or have lived together for
at least two years prior to the reproductive procedure‖ and are
of child bearing age; the BIRC justification for this law has become still more prominent in recent debates as to whether to
include a right to use ART for couples entering into a Pacte Civile de Stabilité or PaCS (roughly ―Pact of Civil Solidarity‖),

better for a child to have both a father and a mother‖); see ROSARIO M. ISASI &
BARTHA M. KNOPPERS, NATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGARDING
HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE GENETIC TESTING 7 (2006), available at http://www
.dnapolicy.org/pdf/geneticTesting.pdf.
78. See Infertility Treatment Act 1995, (Vict.) s 8 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/ita1995264.pdf; Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991, (W. Austl.) ss 4, 23(c), available at http://www
.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/hrta1991331/s4.html (section 4), http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/hrta1991331/s23.html (section 23);
Reproductive Technology Act 1988, (S. Austl.) ss 10(b), 13(3)(b), available at
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/ASSISTED%20REPRODUCTIVE%20T
REATMENT%20ACT%201988/2000.07.05_%281996.08.01%29/1988.10.PDF.
79. Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991, (W. Austl.) ss 4, 23(c).
80. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 13(5) (Eng.).
81. See Aidan Jones, Rules Eased for Second Parent in IVF Births, THE
GUARDIAN, ( Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/02/law-family.
82. Compare Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 14(2)
(Eng.) with Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 13(5) (Eng.).
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open to heterosexual or homosexual couples.83 Iceland‘s Act no.
55/1996 provides that ―Artificial fertilisation may only be carried out if . . . the child to be conceived by the procedure may be
deemed to be ensured good conditions in which to grow up.‖84
Other countries, such as Greece and Japan, also restrict access
to ARTs to women fifty-years-old or younger.85
In the United States, no state currently bans ART use by
aged, single, or LGBT individuals, but several bills have been
introduced in state legislatures to do so.86 Instead, access de83. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology And
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1474 (2008); Patrick Roger, Blocage Sur L‟adoption Par Les Couples Homosexuels [Ban on Adoption by
Homosexual Couples], LE MONDE ( Fr.), Jan. 27, 2006, at 21, available at
http://www.apgl.fr/presse/lemonde20060126-2.pdf; see M. JEAN LEONETTI, LA
COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LA LÉGISLATION ET DE
L‘ADMINISTRATION GÉNÉRALE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE SUR LA PROPOSITION DE
LOI [COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LEGISLATION, AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC], RAPPORT (N° 2211), RELATIVE À
L‘ORGANISATION DU DEBAT PUBLIC SUR LES PROBLEMES ÉTHIQUES ET LES
QUESTIONS DE SOCIETE [REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC DEBATE OVER
ETHICAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIETAL QUESTIONS], Feb. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rapports/r2276.asp#P122_15516; Loi Bioéthique: Les Principales Propositions du Rapport Leonetti [Bioethics Law: The
Main Proposals of Leonetti‟s Report], TFI NEWS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://lci.tf1
.fr/science/sante/2010-01/loi-bioethique-les-principales-propositions-du-rapport
-leonetti-5644995.html.
84. ACT NO. 55/1996 ON ARTIFICIAL IMPREGNATION AND THE USE OF HUMAN SEX CELLS AND EMBRYOS FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH (ICELAND 1996),
available at http://www.althingi.is/dba-bin/unds.pl?txti=/wwwtext/html/lagasofn/
138b/1996055.html&leito=t%E6knifrj%F3vgun#word1 (translation courtesy of
Sigridur Rut Juliusdottir).
85. Nomos (2002:3089) [Medically Assisted Human Reproduction], Official
Gazette of the Helenic Republic 2002, 1:1455 (Greece); Fenton, supra note 75,
at 84 (reviewing Italy‘s law 40); Rachel Brehm King, Redefining Motherhood:
Discrimination in Legal Parenthood in Japan, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL‘Y J. 189,
215 (2009) (explaining that Japan‘s Assisted Reproductive Technology Committee recommends ART be limited to women under 50); Rao, supra note 83
(discussing Italy‘s Law 40 limiting use of ART to women ―of childbearing age‖).
86. At the present moment, these bills do not seem to be moving forward.
See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 44 – 46 (2008)
(citing H.B. 187, 2006 Reg. Sess. of the Va. Gen. Ass.; Mary Beth Schneider,
Assisted Reproduction Bill Dropped, IND. STAR, Oct. 6, 2005, at 2B). Various
U.S. states achieve similar ends through more subtle means such as limiting
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements to cases where the commissioning
couple is legally married, limiting insurance mandates covering IVF to cases of
married heterosexual individuals, and absolving sperm donors of legal parenthood responsibilities only when the recipient is married. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.15(1) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (West 2008); JESSICA ARONS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND
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nials stem from policies adopted by industry groups and attitudes of individual physicians often premised on BIRC justifications. For example, the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) put forth a 1997 statement on access to ART
for older women suggesting that ―postmenopausal pregnancy
should be discouraged,‖ and that physicians should carefully
consider not only threats to the woman‘s health or that of the
child, but also ―the provision for child-rearing.‖87 It explained
that ―[b]ecause parenting is both an emotionally stressful and
physically demanding experience, older women and their partners may be unable to meet the needs of a growing child and
maintain a long parental relationship,‖ and ―children could resent having mothers old enough to be grandmothers and be adversely affected psychologically and socially.‖88 Similarly, the
American College of Pediatricians‘ 2004 position statement advises that ―[g]iven the current body of research . . . it is inappropriate, potentially hazardous to children, and dangerously
irresponsible to change the age-old prohibition on homosexual
parenting, whether by adoption, foster care, or by reproductive
manipulation.‖89 In most states such service denials by providers remain lawful.90
These and other BIRC concerns have been internalized by
U.S. physicians: A recent study found that one-fifth of U.S.
ART treatment providers would refuse to provide services to a
woman without a partner, 48% were ―[v]ery or extremely likely
to turn away‖ a gay couple using surrogates with one man as
sperm donor, and 17% were likely to turn away a lesbian couple
seeking to achieve pregnancy with donor insemination.91 Many
of these practitioners acknowledged a BIRC motivation for
their gate-keeping with 62% and 64% agreeing with the state-

LAW 8 (2007); Cohen & Chen, supra note 14, at 539; Daar, supra, at 46;
John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 356 (2004).
87. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc‘y for Reprod. Med., Oocyte Donation to
Postmenopausal Women, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S254, S255 (2004).
88. Id. at S254 –55 (2004).
89. Press Release, Am. Coll. of Pediatricians, Homosexual Parenting: Is it
Time For Change? ( Mar. 22, 2009), available at http://www.acpeds.org/
Homosexual-Parenting-Is-it-Time-for-Change-Press-Release.html.
90. But see N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Superior
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 970 (Cal. 2008) (holding that a service denial based on
sexual orientation violated California‘s Unruh Civil Rights Act and was not
protected on First Amendment Free Exercise grounds).
91. Gurmankin et al., supra note 3, at 61–65.
THE
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ments ―[i]t is wrong for me to help bring a child into the world
to be cared for by a parent who would be unfit in some way‖
and ―I have the responsibility to consider a parent‘s fitness before helping them conceive a child,‖ respectively.92
Scholars, while taking opposite positions on the underlying
data, have treated BIRC as the appropriate idiom in which to
debate these questions. In asking whether age-based restrictions on IVF pass constitutional muster, Radhika Rao suggests
that ―[a]ge limits should be considered constitutional as long as
they . . . promote a valid objective, such as ensuring that the
children born of such technologies will have parents who are
alive and able to care for them.‖93 More generally, Rao posits
that ―prohibition upon the use of ARTs is [constitutionally]
permissible as long as it is based upon a legitimate interest
that goes beyond mere prejudice,‖ and that ―[t]he government
could limit the use of ARTs in order to prevent physical, psychological, or social harms to the participants or the resulting
children‖ as it does in adoption and that deficits to a child in
being raised in a single or LGBT household could constitute
such harm (although she doubts the claim‘s empirical support).94 In a similar vein, Naomi Cahn treats BIRC as the appropriate subject of inquiry, but nevertheless notes the lack of
strong empirical evidence that children of heterosexual couples
do better than those of gays or lesbians.95 While opposing
sperm donor anonymity and unmarried and LGBT use of ARTs,
Lynn Wardle also explicitly ties the issue to best interests arguments employed in family law as to already existing children
by claiming that ―[d]epriving a child of contact with one of his
or her parents is very harmful to children‖ and pointing inter
alia to laws ―designed to encourage, protect, and facilitate visitation, even if the parents do not get along with each other‖96
He concludes that U.S. laws are problematically ―schizophrenic‖ in that while ―we go to great lengths to protect the child‘s
right to a filial relationship with both parents in all other con-

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 64.
Rao, supra note 83, at 1477.
Id. at 1476–77, 1479 (emphasis added).
NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET
NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 167–70 (2009).
96. Lynn Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 444, 446 (2006).
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ceivable circumstances, we simply ignore that right and that
need of children in the ART context.‖97
The same theme appears in calls by leading scholars to require parental fitness screening for reproductive technology
access patterned on adoption. Debora Spar, now Dean of Columbia University‘s Barnard College, emblemizes this approach
to the problem arguing that
[i]n the field of adoption, the interests and rights of the child are always taken as paramount: no would-be parent in the United States
can legally adopt a child without some outside authority (a child welfare office, licensed adoption agency, or court) deeming that the parent is fit and that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the
child.98

She continues by noting that this ―underlying principle . . . could easily be extended into the realm of assisted reproduction, even if only to scrutinize procedures that are
known to carry extensive risks to the child . . . .‖99 Similarly,
Marsha Garrison has argued that ―[l]ogically, if regulation of
adoption is constitutionally permissible to safeguard the interests of the adoptive child, her biological parents, and would-be
adoptive parents, so is regulation of reproductive technology
aimed at protecting the various actors involved and any children that might be produced.‖100 Furthermore, she argues that
―[t]o the extent that ART—or obstetrical practice—imposes
risks on future children equivalent to those that state and federal law disallow for actual children, there is a sound basis for
regulation aimed at providing protection against such hazards‖
that is justified by ―child-protection aims.‖101 Others make similar claims.102
97. Id. at 451; see also Camille S. Williams, Planned Parent-Deprivation:
Not in the Best Interests of the Child, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 375,
376, 389 (2005) (lamenting that ―given the importance of shared familial history and kinship to individual identity, and the importance of both maternal
and paternal involvement in the development of children, intentionally depriving a child of one parent will surely wound the child in a multitude of ways‖
and that current reproductive technology research and policy are ―about the
individual or couple and not necessarily about the best interests of the child.‖).
98. Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring The Limits of Parental
Choice in Assisted Reproduction, 27 LAW & INEQ. 481, 491 (2009).
99. Id.
100. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1623, 1627 (2008).
101. Id. at 1642; see also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:
An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 835, 858 (2000) (―Our tradition of deference to individual decisions
about coital procreation and parenting undeniably supports equivalent def-
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Several countries have adopted this exact model and tried
to make their reproductive technology access rules more like
their regulation of adoption.103 Victoria, Australia requires
criminal background checks as precondition for IVF usage.104
The Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynecology advises
screening out those who exhibit psychopathologies.105 The
ASRM recommends developing written policies regarding
screening out those with uncontrolled psychiatric illness, a history of child or spousal abuse, or drug abuse.106 At the level of
clinical practice, a 2001 survey of 324 ART clinics in the United
States found that the majority of respondents would deny
access to services to parents who engaged in ―excessive‖ alcohol
consumption, marijuana use, or were convicted of child abuse;
some clinics suggested they would deny access based on paren-

erence to individual choice in the use of technological conception. But deference does not imply abdication of any regulatory role. Indeed, parents who
want to adopt, the ‗traditional‘ method of achieving parenthood non-coitally,
face a maze of state regulations, including rules imposing waiting periods before an adoption is finalized, voiding parental consents obtained prenatally,
permitting rescission of parental consent within stated time limits, and requiring adopting through an intermediary agency.‖ (citation omitted)).
102. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS 33 (1993); Usha
Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 83–84
(2008–09) (proposing that U.S. patients seeking to use surrogates living
abroad could be regulated in a way similar to international adoption, including
―requiring a home study of the commissioning parties, including criminal
background checks‖; however, concluding that international surrogacy should
be abolished rather than regulated); Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at
Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices,
184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591, 596 (2001) (observing that ―[i]t
should not be surprising that ART clinics feel responsibility to limit access in
certain cases‖ because ―concern for the well-being of children has long been a
defining factor of the adoption process‖).
103. See Stern, supra note 102; Storrow, supra note 18, at 2290–91; see also
Daar, supra note 86, at 67 (―Basing a physician‘s ability to deny ART services
on his or her prediction about the child-rearing abilities of a prospective parent is speculative and leaves too much opportunity for masking pure discrimination with concern for offspring.‖).
104. Mixed Response to Victoria‟s IVF Law Changes, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5,
2008, 5:44 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-12-05/mixed-response-to
-victorias-ivf-law-changes/230976.
105. M. Hunfeld et al., Protect the Child from Being Born: Arguments
Against IVF from Heads of the 13 Licensed Dutch Fertility Centres, Ethical
and Legal Perspectives, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 279, 280 (2004).
106. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc‘y for Reprod. Med., Child-Rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564, 565
(2004).
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tal schizophrenia, mental impairment, or suspected child
abuse.107
The Non-Identity problem renders the empirical evidence
about child outcomes irrelevant in BIRC arguments towards
justifying the age, marital status, sexuality, or other parental
fitness restrictions explored by John Robertson and Judith
Daar.108 There is a key problem with the analogy between parental fitness screening for adoption versus reproduction: a particular child waiting to be adopted can be harmed if the child is
placed with unfit parents instead of other parents or continuing
in foster care, etc., although that depends on what life in foster
care would look like. By contrast, if potential genetic parents
are unfit, a particular child that would result cannot be harmed
if gate keeping rules them out because that particular child
would not otherwise come into existence.109
Because policies that alter when individuals reproduce also
create perfect Non-Identity Problems, home study visits and
background checks may be problematic even if the parents
pass, since to the extent they delay the moment sperm meets
egg they are not in the best interests of a particular resulting
child because the delay has caused a different child to result.
B. IMPERFECT NON-IDENTITY PROBLEMS
While perfect Non-Identity Problems are the easiest to see,
a second category of ―imperfect Non-Identity Problems,‖ for example interventions aimed at prohibiting sperm donor anonymity, arise where state action will not necessarily alter when,
whether, and with whom the whole population affected by the
intervention reproduces. As will become clearer as I work
through examples of these below, while perfect Non-Identity

107. Gurmankin et al., supra note 3, at 61–65.
108. See Daar, supra note 86, at 69–71; Robertson, supra note 86, at 341,
343, 347; Robertson, supra note 32, at 29–31.
109. On its face, there is no Non-Identity Problem with removing the child,
once born, from the custody of his rearing parents in favor of his being reared
by another set of parents, and justifying it on the basis of Best Interests of the
Existing Child-type reasoning. But suppose there is a rule to this effect upfront, for example that women over age 50 who successfully reproduce will
have their resulting children removed from their custody and legal parentage
and given to other parents. It is likely that few (if any) parents would choose
to conceive in this circumstance, thereby manufacturing an imperfect NonIdentity problem without regulating reproduction per se. It seems that this
move, too, could not be justified based on best interests grounds for that reason. See infra text accompanying notes 167–70.

458

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:423

Problems make BIRC-type justifications for policies nonsensical; imperfect Non-Identity Problems will sharply reduce the
probability/number of children for whom the BIRC-type reasoning can be invoked in favor of a given intervention.110 To use an
example I will discuss in greater depth, for sperm donation it is
theoretically possible that in a world where donor anonymity
was prohibited there may exist at least one child who will come
into existence with the same genetic code (i.e., when, whether,
and with whom its genetic parents reproduce will be unaltered), but the probability/number of children for whom that
will be true is likely very small (since all three conditions must
go unaltered).
Diagram 1

The idea is illustrated by Diagram 1: The perfect NonIdentity Problem is a fixed point at the end of the continuum
where no member of the class of resulting children on whose

110. To be more precise, it will alter the probability that a set number of
individuals, on whose behalf the intervention is urged, will be harmed.
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behalf the intervention is urged can be said to be harmed, for if
the intervention succeeds none of those children would come into existence, rather other children (or no other children) would
exist. By contrast, we can think of imperfect Non-Identity Problems as a sliding scale filling up the middle of the continuum,
where the larger the number of children who will come into existence with the same genetic code (i.e., whose parents‘ decision
whether, when, and with whom to reproduce will be the same)
whether or not the intervention is in place, the more imperfect
the Non-Identity Problem will be, and thus the larger the number of children for whom BIRC arguments will actually be valid. At the other end of the continuum are cases where no NonIdentity Problem will result because the intervention will not
alter whether, when, and with whom anyone reproduces.
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Diagram 2

Diagram 2 illustrates this point a second way, by showing
the ―imperfect‖ nature of a Non-Identity Problem as a question
of the degree of overlap between two populations—the population of children who will come into existence if the intervention
is not in place (on the left) and the population of children who
will come into existence if the intervention is in place (on the
right). The zone where the two circles overlap represents the
sub-population of children who will come into existence with
the same genetic code (i.e., when, whether, and with whom reproduction occurs is the same) whether or not the intervention
is in place. As the BIRC-type argument becomes more imperfect, the zone of intersection between the two circles increases,
meaning that the probability/number of children who will come
into existence with the same genetic code whether or not the
intervention is in place increases. There is no Non-Identity
Problem regarding the population of children falling into this
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zone of intersection. We can actually say they are harmed since
their counterfactual is not nonexistence but existence with versus without the intervention in place, assuming arguendo the
intervention prevents harm to them.111
This description helps clarify that the examples that interest me share two features. First, the governmental intervention
is urged on the basis of BIRC-type reasoning. While many
governmental interventions may have the alteration of when,
whether, and with whom we reproduce as a side effect, it is only those that are justified by BIRC reasoning that the NonIdentity Problem renders problematic. For example, a state‘s
decision to shut down a public university or even increase its
tuition may alter when, whether, and with whom individuals
reproduce if many people meet their future husband or wife in
university. There is no Non-Identity Problem with that intervention, though, because closure or tuition hikes are not being
justified on the basis of the interests of the children who will
result.112 Second, for all my examples, even if not giving rise to
a perfect Non-Identity Problem, the Non-Identity Problem is
fairly close to the perfect end of the continuum and closer to
that end than the no Non-Identity Problem end. I explore the
implications of this latter point in more depth in Part III. Here
I set out three examples of imperfect Non-Identity Problems.
1. Sperm Donor Anonymity
In 1985, Sweden became the first country to prohibit anonymous sperm ‗donation‘113 by requiring that donor-conceived

111. This diagram is slightly misleading in that the circles stay the same
size throughout, when in fact the size of the circles representing the number of
children born will likely change given most of these interventions. This is
clearest to see in interventions that affect whether given individuals will reproduce, where the intervention, if it succeeds, reduces the number of children. This idea has important implications for non-person-affecting principles
discussed in Part III, but for the purposes of a diagram I favored simplicity.
112. There are some related (but more complex) problems with legislation
to try and ―save‖ the environment that may change who makes up the future
generation whose interests we are trying to serve. See PARFIT, supra note 32,
at 371–77 (describing the impact of choices on future events in the environmental context). I put environmental cases to one side in this Article except for
one tentative suggestion at supra note 38.
113. The term ―donor‖ is actually a misnomer since most provision of sperm
is for compensation; still, I will rely on the more familiar terms ―donor‖ and
―donation‖ rather than ―provider‖ and ―provision‖ but ask the reader to keep
this caveat in mind. Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous
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children be able to receive identifying information about their
sperm donor when ―sufficiently mature.‖114 The law stemmed
from studies of the welfare of adopted children, which the
Swedes extrapolated to donor-conceived children.115 A number
of jurisdictions followed suit including Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Australian States of Victoria and Western Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway.116 Most recently the United
Kingdom and New Zealand adopted similar policies in 2004, in
both cases justifying that approach on BIRC grounds.117
Leading scholars have also treated the potential harm to
resulting children from donor anonymity as the right lens to
consider whether the United States should adopt similar prohibitions. For example, Naomi Cahn writes that ―[a] law that required parents to tell their children of their donor origins and
that permitted children to contact their donors could be justified on a showing that, without this information, children experience grave psychological, social, mental, and emotional difficulties.‖ But she claims that ―[t]hese data do not, however,
exist‖ and that ―[c]hildren born through the new technologies
appear to be as well adjusted as other children.‖118 Similarly,
Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 257, 258–59
(2002).
114. Claes Gottlieb et al., Disclosure of Donor Insemination to the Child:
The Impact of Swedish Legislation on Couples‟ Attitudes, 15 HUM. REPROD.
2052, 2052 (2000).
115. Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for NonAnonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8 (2008) (citing Gottlieb,
supra note 114).
116. Dennison, supra note 115, at 8–9; Ilke Turkmendag et al., The Removal of Donor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-Be
Parents, 22 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 283, 283–84 (2008).
117. Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, § 4 (a), (e) (N.Z.)
(―[T]he health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of
an assisted reproductive procedure . . . should be an important consideration
in all decisions about that procedure,‖ and more specifically, that ―donor
offspring should be made aware of their genetic origins and be able to access
information about those origins‖); Ken Daniels & Alison Douglass, Access to
Genetic Information by Donor Offspring and Donors: Medicine, Policy and Law
In New Zealand, 27 MED. & L. 131, 137 (2008) (noting how the New Zealand
law reflects a principle that ―knowledge by donor-offspring of their genetic origins is central to the health and well-being of children born as a result of assisted reproductive procedure‖); see also Christopher De Jonge & Christopher
L. R. Barratt, Gamete Donation: A Question of Anonymity, 85 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 500 (2006); Dennison, supra note 115115, at 9–10; Can You Be
Anonymous as a Sperm, Egg or Embryo Donor? HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1973.html.
118. CAHN, supra note 95, at 126.
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Ellen Waldman treats the issues of openness in adoption and
sperm donation as equivalent, both hinging on a best interests
analysis, but while she finds the empirical evidence of harm to
children from closed adoption compelling, she concludes that
―[t]he data pushes for openness, but only modestly‖119 regarding reproductive technologies.120 Other scholars have made
similar BIRC-type evaluations.121
Explaining the problem with the BIRC justification here is
a bit more complex. Prohibitions on sperm donor anonymity
tend to alter whether and with whom individuals reproduce.
Such regulation may cause some would-be donors not to donate, altering whether and with whom they reproduce. Further,
regimes that prohibit anonymity usually ceteris paribus reduce
the number of sperm donors, as has been the experience in
Sweden, the Australian state of Victoria, England, New Zealand, and the Netherlands when they eliminated donor anonymity.122 If donor anonymity were to actually produce a true gamete shortage, then, as to some portion of the population
seeking donors, we would end up with a de facto restriction on
whether they reproduce, creating a Non-Identity Problem in a
119. Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children, 35 CAP. U. L. REV.
517, 544 (2006).
120. Id. at 524, 532, 536, 544 (2006).
121. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and The Construction of
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 682–88 (2008) (arguing that ―most people
agree that we must consider children‘s interests in any question about parenthood,‖ while conceding that data bears on whether donor anonymity for gamete donation should be permitted ―is far from definitive‖); Dennison, supra
note 115, at 17 (concluding that ―a number of studies that have been conducted have reached the same conclusion as those that have studied adoptees:
namely, that for their own well-being, donor-conceived children need to know
about their background‖); Julie L. Sauer, Competing Interests and Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 939– 43 (2009);
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification In Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human
Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 257, 268 (2002) (―From the perspective
of the child, and the person that child will become, knowledge of how and from
whom one came to be is now being seen as part of the right to an identity.‖);
Wardle, supra note 96, at 444 –51.
122. See, e.g., June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethical Understandings Into the Market for Fertility
Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 540 (2006); Waldman, supra note
119, at 549–57 (discussing and collecting studies). For a comprehensive discussion of the disastrous effects of anonymity prohibitions on the sperm supply
in Sweden, the U.K., and the Australian state of Victoria, see Gaia Bernstein,
Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189, 1207–18 (2010).
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way similar to access restrictions. Even if this regulation results only in waiting lists (as has been the case in many countries),123 that may also de facto limit whether individuals reproduce, because some women seeking sperm donation will be
at the end of their fertility cycle and often multiple attempts
are required to successfully inseminate.124
To deal with such shortages many countries adopt mechanisms aimed at recruiting new sperm donors, thereby altering
with whom individuals reproduce. ―In Sweden, recruitment efforts have focused increasingly on the older, more altruistically
motivated donor as a way of rebounding from the initial dampening effects of the‖ prohibition on donor anonymity.125 The
Australian state of Victoria has also tried to deal with low donor supply by targeting this population,126 and one clinic in
New South Wales, Australia even flew Canadian students to
Australia for complimentary ‗vacations‘ that required sperm
donations every second day.127
Furthermore, even if the same donors are involved under
the new and old regime, when they donate, and thus when reproduction takes place, may change dramatically. For example,
I may choose to donate at age 40 rather than age 20 because I
am concerned about donor anonymity before I am married and
have children,128 or it could change slightly if I choose to donate
tomorrow rather than today because of the public relations
campaign used to get me to donate in the anonymity-prohibited
world. Both would be sufficient to produce a Non-Identity Problem. It is also conceivable that anonymity prohibitions will
123. See Bernstein, supra note 122.
124. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine estimates that with
artificial insemination ―the monthly chance of pregnancy ranges from 8% to
15%.‖ AM. SOC‘Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE
FOR PATIENTS 12 (2006), available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_
Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/thirdparty
.pdf.
125. Waldman, supra note 119, at 552 (citing A. Lalos et al., Recruitment
and Motivation of Semen Providers in Sweden, 18 HUM. REPROD. 212 (2003)).
126. Id. at 553 (explaining clinics in Victoria, Australia, targeted older, altruistically motived donors by using public relations campaigns).
127. Id.
128. Cf. Ken R. Daniels et al., Information Sharing in Semen Donation:
The Views of Donors, 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 673, 680 (1997) (suggesting that while
young students who donate for financial gain—a typical pool of sperm donors—often become unwilling to donate when anonymity is removed, older and
married men who already have children are less phased by prohibitions on
anonymity and could be tapped as a potential new donor pool).
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change the timing of insemination on the recipient side, for example, if shortages produce wait-lists or other forms of queuing
for access.
In any event, so long as a different sperm meets a different
egg due to the anonymity prohibition rule, it cannot be better
for the child who would have existed in the anonymity regime,
as that child will never exist. All of this readily distinguishes
the situation here from the adoption context, where the enactment of openness laws (it is argued) improves the welfare of existing children129 but does not affect whether those children
come into existence.
To be sure, there may exist at least one child who would
have come into existence in both the anonymity-permitted and
anonymity-prohibited regimes—one child conceived when the
same donated sperm meets the same egg and for whom the rule
has no effect on whether, when, and with whom reproduction
takes place. As to that particular potential child (or children) a
BIRC justification will be valid, which is why the Non-Identity
Problem is imperfect. But the sheer number of children for
whom this will be true is much smaller than the universe of all
donor-conceived children to which the arguments debated by
Cahn,130 Waldman,131 and others are meant to apply. I further
discuss this question of whether the probability and numbers
affected matter in the next Part.
What if individuals circumvent the law, for example if a
firm offers a black market in anonymous sperm donation? The
pool of donors and recipients, or the occasion in which donation
takes places, is still likely to change—once again creating a
Non-Identity Problem. But even if for a sub-set of the population use of a black market would not alter when, whether, or
with whom they reproduced, such that as to them the NonIdentity Problem is avoided, that can hardly be an argument
for adopting this legal intervention. If the only justified instances of a law are when the law is broken, the law should not
be one we should enact. The same is true for cases where the
law merely fails to have its desired effect, for example, abstinence education programs that do not produce much
abstinence.

129. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 119, at 520–28 (discussing several studies and arguments debating the benefits of open adoption).
130. See Cahn, supra note 65.
131. See Waldman, supra note 119.
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2. Sperm and Egg ‗Donor‘ and Surrogate Compensation
Surrogacy, egg donation, and sperm donation are sometimes attacked on the claim that the resulting children are
harmed because of donor or surrogate compensation. Many
countries have restricted surrogacy. Britain, Canada and the
Australian states of Victoria and New South Wales have
banned or limited compensation for egg and sperm donation
beyond expenses incurred.132 Canada, the Australian states of
Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia have also
made commercial surrogacy a crime,133 as have the U.S. states
of New York, Michigan, and Washington, and the District of
Columbia.134 Great Britain de facto prohibits commercial surrogacy by forbidding the transfer of parentage rights from the
surrogate to the intended parents absent ―a showing before the
court that the surrogate received no financial or other beneficial consideration in exchange for her services as a surrogate.‖135 The U.S. states of Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Mexico and Oregon render commercial surrogacy contracts unenforceable.136
The rationales behind these laws tend to be somewhat
opaque from the legislative histories, but the judicial and scholarly literature is a bit clearer. Although much of the literature
132. See Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002, No. 144, s 23 (Austl.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c .2, S7(1) (Can.); Press Release,
Human Fertilization & Embryology Auth., HFEA Confirms UK Position on
Payment for Egg Donors ( Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/
784.html; Human Fertilization & Embryology Auth., Sperm, Egg and Embryo
Donation (SEED) Report, 14 (2005), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/SEEDReport05
.pdf; see also Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science,
Ethics, and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women‟s
Rights, 29 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 193, 204 –06 (2008).
133. Surrogacy Bill 2010 (N.S.W.), pt 2 div 2 s 8 (Austl.); Surrogacy Act
2008 (W. Austl.), pt 2 div 2 ss 8–9 (Austl.); Infertility Treatment Act 1995
(Vict.), pt 6 s 59 (Austl.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2,
§ 6(1) (Can.); see Ailis L. Burpee, Note, Momma Drama: A Study of How Canada‟s National Regulation of Surrogacy Compares to Australia‟s Independent
State Regulation of Surrogacy, 37 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 305, 310–20 (2009).
134. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401 to 16-402 (LexisNexis 2001) (punishing
both commercial and altruistic surrogacy); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859
(West 2002); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) ( McKinney 2010); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210–.260 (West 2005).
135. Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial
Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 275, 286 (2009).
136. See generally Darra L. Hofman, ―Mama‟s Baby, Daddy‟s Maybe:” A
State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449 (2009) (50 state survey).
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on prohibiting (or limiting) compensation for egg (and much
less frequently sperm) ―donation‖ focuses on what I have elsewhere termed ―coercion‖ concerns about the voluntariness of
the decision to participate due to monetary inducement, a form
of Legal Paternalism justification in Part I‘s taxonomy—and
anticommodificationist corruption,137 compensation has also
been challenged due to its harmful effects on the children who
result.
Kenneth Baum, for example, considers whether ―a market
in oocytes could have adverse psychological effects on the resultant offspring.‖138 While he rejects the empirical bona fides of
the claim, he accepts the question‘s validity.139 In a famous article, the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson argues that commercial surrogacy is unethical because it poses harms to both the
surrogate and the resulting child, suggesting that ―no one
represents the child‘s interests in the surrogate industry‖ and
that commercial surrogacy‘s ―substitutions of market norms for
parental norms represent ways of treating children as commodities which are degrading to them.‖140 She asks rhetorically:
―[w]ould it be any wonder if a child born of a surrogacy agreement feared resale by parents who have such an attitude‖ and
if ―a child who knew how anxious her parents were that she
have the ‗right‘ genetic makeup might fear that her parent‘s
love was contingent upon her expression of these characteristics[?]‖141 Martha Ertman similarly wonders whether ―purchasing gametes to conceive a child could cause the child to feel that
he or she has been purchased like a new car‖ and notes Peggy
Radin‘s claim that ―conceiving of any child in market rhetoric
harms personhood.‖142
137. I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing:
Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–90
(2003).
138. Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, BYU L. REV. 107, 156 (2001).
139. See id. at 157.
140. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women‟s Labor a Commodity, 19 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 71, 75–77 (1990).
141. Id. at 77.
142. Martha M. Ertman, What‟s Wrong With a Parenthood Market?: A New
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2003)
(quoting MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 139 (1996)).
While, unlike Anderson, Ertman is ultimately unconvinced of the claim‘s empirical support, she nonetheless concludes that potential negative effects on
children from gamete sale are a relevant consideration in making policy. Id.
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This argument runs into an imperfect Non-Identity Problem. Absent the inducement of compensation, it is unlikely that
the intending parents would be able to find a surrogate or egg
donors, as evidenced by the shortages experienced by Canada
and Britain after banning donor compensation for eggs.143
These compensation bans will thus frequently result in a de
facto restriction on whether individuals can reproduce at all.
Even if a State succeeded in recruiting a large population of altruistic donors, the Non-Identity Problem persists: so long as
that population of altruistic egg/sperm donors and surrogates is
different from the population of compensated ones (with whom)
or conception occurs at a different time (when), the ban on compensation cannot be said to be in the best interests of this
child—the one who would exist in a commercialized regime but
does not in one that makes compensation unlawful.144 The
problem is imperfect because there may exist at least one child
who will come into existence with the same genetic code whether or not such compensation is permitted.
3. The Enforcement of Surrogacy Contracts
BIRC justifications have been offered (alongside Paternalism) for the nonenforceability of surrogacy agreements that allocate parenting rights, a position explicitly adopted by statute
in some U.S. states.145
Leading court decisions have pointed to BIRC grounds in
holding surrogacy agreements unenforceable. In Matter of Baby
M, the New Jersey Supreme Court famously held unenforcea-

143. See, e.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 201 (2006). As to surrogacy, The Baby M court explicitly noted this problem in its opinion, writing
―all parties concede that it is unlikely that surrogacy will survive without
money. Despite the alleged selfless motivation of surrogate mothers, if there is
no payment, there will be no surrogates, or very few.‖ Matter of Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988).
144. Unlike some of the other examples I have canvassed above, in this
context it is not particularly the intent of the regulator to alter with whom individuals reproduce. That is, they would be just as happy if all donors and all
recipients and the time of donation stayed exactly the same, just with anonymity removed. Is that a relevant distinction? I think not; the question is
whether the BIRC justification can be used to justify prohibitions on sperm
donor anonymity, and any time we know that when, whether, or with whom
we reproduce will be altered by an intervention (whether the regulator independently desires that this occur or not) that makes the BIRC justification
unavailing.
145. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 to 47/75 (West 2009); Hofman, supra note 136.

2011]

REGULATING REPRODUCTION

469

ble a traditional surrogacy agreement between William and
Elizabeth Stern and Mary-Beth Whitehead, relying on analogies to laws prohibiting baby-selling and requiring a best interests of the child judgment before authorizing adoption.146 The
court‘s decision problematically suggests that surrogacy harms
the interests of resulting children by decrying:
[w]orst of all, however, is the contract‘s total disregard of the best interests of the child There is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any time to determine the fitness of the Sterns
as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the child of not living with
her natural mother.147

California court decisions on the enforcement of traditional
and gestational surrogacy contracts have also considered
whether enforcement of these contracts is in the best interests
of the resulting children, without realizing the imperfect NonIdentity Problem with that inquiry.148
Similarly, in J.R. M.R. & W.K.J. v. Utah, a Utah federal
court declared unconstitutional a Utah statute declaring that
the gestational mother would always be granted legal parentage.149 The court accepted the State‘s premise that protection
of the best interests of the child could constitute a compelling
interest sufficient to overcome a fundamental constitutional
right, but found the statute infirm in that it failed to consider
best interests on a case-by-case basis.150
In other states, a BIRC-analysis has been built into the
surrogacy process directly by statute. New Hampshire, for example, statutorily requires judicial pre-clearance for a surrogacy agreement to be enforced and demands that the intended
parents must be examined and a licensed child placement

146. 537 A.2d at 1227.
147. Id. at 1248.
148. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (―[A]s Professor
S[c]hultz recognizes, the interests of children, particularly at the outset of
their lives, are ‗[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose to
bring them into being.‘ Thus, ‗[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults
who will be responsible for a child‘s welfare is likely to correlate significantly
with positive outcomes for parents and children alike.‘‖) (quoting Marjorie
Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 397)); id. at 799–
800 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing that prior contractual agreements as to
surrogacy should be ignored and parentage determined purely by inquiry as to
which potential parent would serve the best interests of the children).
149. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002).
150. Id.

470

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:423

agency or the Department of Health and Human Services must
perform a home study to verify that the intended couple can
provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
other basic necessities.151 The Uniform Parentage Act adopts a
similar approach.152
This focus on BIRC considerations is also evident in scholarly work. Richard Epstein, no fan of the non-enforcement of
surrogacy agreements, considers seriously the possibility that
intended parents will abuse or neglect their child but presses
―is there any reason to think that parents by surrogacy would
not love the children whom they obtain by this arrangement?
Of course the risks here are not zero . . . . But by the same token . . . children conceived by normal means often run a far
greater risk of abuse.‖153 Other commentators make similar
moves.154
Once again this logic is problematic in that but-for the anticipation that their surrogacy contract would be enforced,
commissioning couples might have not used a surrogate at all,
might have employed a different surrogate (e.g., a surrogate in
another state or country that does enforce these contracts), or
might have altered the timing of the insemination (for example
by prolonging their search for an experienced surrogate). Perhaps the Non-Identity problem is more imperfect here, but in
any event it weakens the force of BIRC arguments.
Intriguingly, the BIRC justification seems to have more
force as to gestational surrogates, for in this case patients are

151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 to 18 (LexisNexis 2010).
152. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(3), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001) ((requiring inter
alia, ―unless waived by the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made
a home study of the intended parents and the intended parents meet the standards of fitness applicable to adoptive parents.‖) (alteration in original)).
153. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2320–21 (1995).
154. See, e.g., Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV.
429, 485 (2004) (―Are preconception agreements in the best interests of the
children produced through such arrangements? No . . . . Absent a determination of the individual needs of a particular child, these agreements, even if
pre-approved by a court, cannot be based upon a true best interest analysis.‖);
Amanda M. Holliday, Who‟s Your Daddy (And Mommy)? Creating Certainty
for Texas Couples Entering into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1101 (2003) (refuting BIRC type concerns by arguing that ―the most common
users of surrogacy—infertile couples—are . . . more stable parents than people
conceiving normally, and thus, the resulting child is more likely to have a stable and safe home‖) (quoting another source)).
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usually seeking out a surrogate in which to implant an already
(or soon-to-be) fertilized pre-embryo, such that the with whom
dimension remains unchanged, suggesting the problem is more
imperfect and the BIRC justification concomitantly stronger.
This would suggest the opposite result from the case law, which
is more likely to enforce gestational rather than traditional
surrogacy agreements, for example the California Supreme
Court‘s decision in Johnson v. Calvert.155 Of course, as discussed above, it is unsurprising that these courts are not attuned to this particular difference given their general failure to
consider the problems with BIRC reasoning.
***
In this Part I have shown that a large number of state interventions that influence when, whether, and with whom we
reproduce are justified on BIRC grounds. However, as commonly presented—as a Millian Harm Principle concerned with the
interests of vulnerable children, that is as an analogue to similar reasoning in family law governing child abuse or adoption—
what I have said demonstrates why the BIRC justificatory
idiom is unpersuasive; indeed I would go so far as to say it is
logically incoherent.
III. REBOOTING BEST INTERESTS? REFORMULATED
BIRC JUSTIFICATIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS
I have shown that courts, legislatures, and commentators
frequently invoke BIRC justifications to ground a large number
of interventions aimed at influencing when, whether, and with
whom we reproduce, and why this is flawed in Perfect NonIdentity Problem cases. In this Part I want to examine whether
BIRC justifications could be saved or, perhaps more accurately,
reformulated, and I examine three possible ways of doing so.156
Throughout I consider whether these three approaches might
justify some modes of intervention (e.g., informational, funding)
but not others (e.g., bodily integrity infringements, criminal
155. See, e.g., 851 P.2d at 782 (Cal. 1993). Of course if things like timing of
birth or the identity of the gestational parent were found sufficient to create
Non-Identity Problems, gestational surrogacy agreements would pose the
same problems. See supra note 38.
156. The non-person-affecting principle is arguably more of a break with
BIRC, but each of the three are much closer to BIRC than the three substitute
approaches I describe at the end of this Article and take up in Cohen, supra
note 9.
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prohibition, etc.).
Because BIRC reasoning is only problematic for cases that
produce children with lives worth living, I first consider whether we might still be able to use BIRC reasoning to justify the
interventions discussed in Part II by arguing that if left unchecked these reproductive activities would indeed create a life
not worth living.
Second, I examine whether the novel distinction I have introduced between perfect and imperfect Non-Identity Problems
may allow us to draw a distinction that would concede the unworkability of BIRC justifications for the perfect cases but
claim that it is a valid justification for intervening in the imperfect cases.
Third, I adapt a proposal by philosophers (most prominently Parfit himself and Dan Brock) who suggest that the wrongfulness of these reproductive acts stems not from harming the
children that result, but from the failure to produce children
who suffered less or had more opportunity, what they call nonperson-affecting principles.157
I show that each of these reformulations faces problems
and none can ultimately save BIRC reasoning. At the end of
this Part, I offer some brief tentative thoughts on the implication of what I have said for the constitutionality of the interventions discussed above.
A. LIVES NOT WORTH LIVING
The BIRC-justification is not problematic for cases where
the resulting child will have a life not worth living because here
one might argue that an individual has been harmed by being
brought into existence. Is it at all plausible that courts, commentators, and legislators could conclude that each of Part II‘s
interventions prevents the existence of children who have exactly that kind of life?
It seems very unlikely. This kind of life has to be ―so burdensome and without compensating benefits to the individual
with the disease that it is worse than never existing at all,‖ the
kind where we might even say that abortion of the fetus was
desirable for the child that would have resulted.158 While there
is controversy as to whether ―lives not worth living‖ is an inco-

157. See PARFIT, supra note 32; Brock, supra note 32.
158. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 233.
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herent concept or a null set, even defenders of the concept think
of the set as exceedingly small and usually mention two particularly awful diseases as possible members, Lesch-Nyhan and
Tay-Sachs, and even these cases have proven controversial.159
Infants with the incurable Lesch-Nyhan syndrome begin (at
approximately 6 months of age) a process of neurological and
physiological deterioration involving athetosis (involuntary
writhing movements), severe mental deficiencies, and a tendency towards compulsive self-mutilation often requiring placing the child‘s elbows in splints, wrapping her hands in gauze,
and sometimes extracting all her teeth.160 Tay-Sachs has its
onset in infancy and leads to ―hypotonia [deficiencies in muscle
tone], progressive loss of vision, loss of interest in surroundings, and loss of attained milestones, with death occurring at
about the age of 4.‖161
Even assuming (arguendo) that growing up with a single or
gay parent, a parent who is 50 at one‘s birth, without knowing
one‘s genetic parent‘s identity, or with the knowledge that one
was the result of market transactions produce a less-good-thanaverage life, it seems very hard to conclude that any of these
cases would produce a life not worth living. Of the cases discussed in Part II, only the severe genetic abnormalities stemming from incest pose even an arguable case of a life not worth
living. If one adopts a narrow conception of that category (as I
do) containing Lesch-Nyhan syndrome and Tay-Sachs but not
much else, even the conclusion that incest produces a life not
worth living seems suspect. Further, in the wrongful life cases,
the courts have routinely rejected the classification of comparably serious genetic abnormalities as giving rise to a life not
worth living.162

159. See, e.g., id.; Alexander M. Capron, Punishing Reproductive Choices in
the Name of Liberal Genetics, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 683, 689 (2002) (―While
the self-mutilation involved in Lesch-Nyhan disease seems Jobian in its horror, the lack of awareness of self-suffering that seems to characterize the neurological collapse of infants affected by Tay-Sachs disease would lead many
people to say that the latter is a condition that is nearly unbearable for the
child‘s parents rather than for the child.‖).
160. E.g., Robert F. Weir, Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborn,
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 416 (John D. Arido & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 4th ed. 1995).
161. See 5 ATTORNEYS‘ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 17.21(3) (Roscoe N. Gray
& Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d. ed. 2000).
162. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 696–703
(Ill. 1987) (Hemophilia B); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 –25 (Tex.
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Thus, it seems implausible that any of the interventions
discussed in Part II can be justified as preventing of lives not
worth living, with the possible exception of the criminal prohibition of adult brother-sister incest, but even that seems dubious.
B. HOLDING THE LINE AT IMPERFECT NON-IDENTITY PROBLEMS
In Part II I showed why BIRC justifications are a nonstarter for perfect Non-Identity Problem cases. One possible response is to concede that point only as to the perfect NonIdentity Problems but not the imperfect ones (e.g., sperm donoranonymity, bans on selling gametes, the nonenforcement of
surrogacy contracts).
Recall that, in imperfect Non-Identity Problem cases, there
may exist at least one child who will come into existence (in the
sense that the child will have the same genetic code) whether
or not the intervention is implemented because when, whether,
and with whom an individual reproduces may remain unchanged even if the intervention succeeds. If that result obtains, one can say that the resulting child is harmed if the intervention is not put in place since his or her counterfactual is
not nonexistence but existence in a less well-off state without
the protection of the intervention. For example, existing with
knowledge of your genetic parentage is better than existence
without that knowledge because of sperm donor anonymity, or
at least so it is argued. As the number of individuals we predict
to come into existence with the same genetic code whether or
not the intervention is put in place increases, the Non-Identity
Problem becomes increasingly imperfect.
It is therefore useful to understand the imperfect NonIdentity Problem as posing a problem of over-inclusivity as illustrated in Diagram 3. The closer we are to a perfect NonIdentity Problem, the more over-inclusive the intervention in
that the intervention seeks to prevent a large number of reproductive acts, but for only a small number of them is the BIRCjustification appropriate.

1984) (Duchenne muscular dystrophy).
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Diagram 3

Diagram 3 maps this by showing the number of cases
where the intervention will have effect and the sub-set of those
cases that can be justified on BIRC grounds. The rule is that
with increasing perfection of the Non-Identity Problem there is
increasing over-inclusivity.
On the normative side, whether the perfect/imperfect distinction should make a difference as to whether BIRC adequately justifies state intervention depends on high-level moral/political theory commitments and what underlies the best
interests of existing children type argument.
On one extreme, the best interests argument could be
thought of as a strong deontological side constraint on maximizing good states of the world, a sort of categorical rule that
says ―state intervention should be set up in such a way that, to

476

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:423

the extent possible, no child is harmed.‖ At this extreme, the
distinction between perfect and imperfect Non-Identity Problem cases will carry a lot of weight; for as long as one child will
be harmed if sperm donor anonymity is permitted (for example), that is a sufficient justification for state intervention notwithstanding parental interests in using anonymous sperm donor. In fact, though, the imperfect cases pose not just a
question of the number of children harmed163 and the severity
of harm, but also a problem of probability—like determining an
electron‘s position at the atomic level—in any given case we do
not know whether the same genetic child will in fact result and
can also only make a probabilistic determination of harm, such
that the side constraint distinguishing perfect and imperfect
cases would have to be not ―do not harm even a single child‖
but instead ―do not entertain any probability of harm to even a
single child.‖
It is beyond cavil that such a strong side constraint for the
BIRC-type justification would go far beyond what we currently
tolerate for state interventions to protect the best interests of
existing children. The current rules pertaining to the detection
and prosecution of child abuse, re-assignment of parentage, and
other similar rules, have as their goal a reduction in the incidence of harm to children. However, if instead we had a strong
and single-minded side constraint of preventing the possibility
of harm to a small number of children, we would entertain
much more intrusive forms of state monitoring, such as closedcircuit televisions in every room of every house with government employees constantly watching. If one finds such a proposal quite repulsive, as I do, that suggests that, as important
as the welfare of existing children is, we are not comfortable
with a very strong side constraint. We are implicitly adopting a
framework that treats the probability and number of children
who will be harmed as one consideration to be balanced against
what a stronger intervention would mean for countervailing interests in family privacy and child-rearing autonomy.164

163. And therefore the recurring moral theory problem of should the numbers matter. Cf. F. M. Kamm, Aggregation and Two Moral Methods, 17 UTILITAS 1 (2005) (discussing the question whether in trade-off situations we should
consider the relative numbers of people); John Taurek, Should the Numbers
Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977) (similar).
164. Thus, we are implicitly endorsing an approach that trades off invasions of privacy autonomy against the probability of harm, the number of
children harmed, and the severity of harm to children.
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If this more consequentialist analysis dominates as to best
interests of existing children, it also seems appropriate as to
best interests of resulting children. Harm to resulting children
is bad, but the mere fact that children might be harmed does
not itself tell us that an intervention to prevent that harm is
justified. Rather we need to consider all costs and benefits, including the effect on the welfare of the parents whose choices
are barred by the intervention. In the sperm donor anonymity
case, for example, these countervailing interests would include
concerns about the privacy interests of donors, the autonomy of
rearing parents to decide whether to reveal that the child was
donor-conceived, shortages in sperm donations, and the cost
and administrability of such a system.165 As the Non-Identity
Problem becomes increasingly perfect and the intervention increasingly over inclusive as to the harm it prevents, it becomes
harder to justify on this analysis, even if we value parental
rights and procreative autonomy very little indeed.
If one believes in a broad and important conception of procreative liberty,166 or otherwise finds important the parental interests impinged on by the interventions discussed above, the
appropriate tradeoff between parental interests and children‘s
welfare in these imperfect cases should clearly and conclusively
tilt against intervention. One would already demand a quite
significant showing of detriment to child welfare to justify restrictions here absent the Non-Identity Problem, and whatever
showing is made will have to be discounted by the much smaller number and probability of children who will be harmed.
But even if one thinks the importance of these parental interests is frequently overstated, as long as those interests deserve some weight—which seems highly plausible—on this
more consequentialist analysis, the trade-off will likely favor

165. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 95, at 117–29; Dennison, supra note 115,
at 18–24; Pasquale Patrizio et al., Disclosure to Children Conceived with Donor Gametes Should Be Optional, 16 HUM. REPROD. 2036, 2036–38 (2001) (discussing the various reasons parents would choose not to disclose and arguing
that disclosure should be optional); Waldman, supra note 119, at 549–57 (describing the interests of adults in the disclosure debate). For my own take on
these issues, see I. Glenn Cohen, Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of
Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2011).
166. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 24 (1994) (―Procreative liberty should enjoy presumptive primacy when conflicts about its exercise
arise because control over whether one reproduces or not is central to personal
identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one‘s life.‖).
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parental interests in the imperfect cases from Part II. All of
these cases are fairly close to the perfect end of the continuum
such that the intervention is very over inclusive and the liberty
of a large number of individuals will be limited in order to
achieve a small probability of harm prevention for a small subset of resulting children. If the parental interests set back by
these restrictions deserve some weight, even if not treated as a
super-value, when aggregated across a large number of individuals whose liberty will be restricted, the harm from diminution of those interests should outweigh the small probabilistic
chance of harm as to a small number of children.167 Therefore,
for these examples, holding the line at perfect Non-Identity
cases seems difficult.
It is important, though, to emphasize that this conclusion
is dependent on the closeness of these cases to the perfect NonIdentity Problem pole of the continuum. To see why, consider
the following possible objection. There currently exists a set of
child welfare rules protecting existing children by specifying
that certain forms of child abuse will result in removing the
child from parental custody and/or sanction of the parents.
Those laws are avowedly premised on Best Interests of Existing
Children reasoning, and at least initially seem immune from
the Non-Identity Problem. But suppose a pair of parents, Mr.
and Mrs. Hannigan, who plan on conceiving naturally, forthrightly admit (in song) to anyone who will listen that they intend to give the daughter they have always hoped for (whom
they will name Annie) a hard-knock life full of child abuse
(though not abuse so bad as to make poor little Annie‘s life not
worth living). Suppose further they specify that only if they can
abuse their daughter will they go ahead and have one, and if
instead the law prevents it or terminates their parental rights
for abuse they will refrain from conceiving. Does my argument
imply that the child abuse laws cannot be justified by best interests reasoning because if they are in place Annie will never

167. Of course, if one attached a very small value to countervailing parental interests here, one might still reach the opposite conclusion that small
probabilities of harm to small numbers of children did dominate. In this Article I have not tried to convince the reader how to value those interests. Indeed, I am not sure I could if I tried, and I think the valuation of the interests
differ across cases. Instead, I have tried to make it clear that one‘s valuation of
these interests has to be much smaller than one might originally have
thought, in order to justify the regulation.
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be born, and even if being abused is bad it cannot be said to be
worse than nonexistence?
This is a very troubling and, as far as I know, novel argument. One way to avoid it might be to rely on one of the other
strategies discussed below for determining that parental action
is wrongful, notwithstanding the Non-Identity Problem, or to
argue that there are constraints on what we can do to people
once they are born, even if those constraints will discourage
their being born.168 Allowing the perfect/imperfect line to do
168. In a brief exploration of whether the State should prohibit mistreating
animals, Robert Nozick considered a similar claim he thought should be rejected: that we can eat animals because but-for our consumption they would
not be born and ―[t]o exist for a while is better than never to exist at all.‖ ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 38 (1974). To try to defeat this
argument by a reductio ad absurdum, Nozick applied the same argument to
parents and suggested that ―once a person exists, not everything compatible
with his overall existence being a net plus can be done to him, even by those
who created him‖ and then suggested the same should hold true for animals.
Id. at 38–39; cf. Susan M. Wolf et al., Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 327, 330–35 (2003) (making a similar point in explaining the ethical
limitations that should restrain the ability of parents to genetically engineer
donor children to help existing children, so called savior siblings).
Even if Nozick is right about this claim, all of the examples from Part II,
with one possible exception, differ from Nozick‘s hypothetical. In Nozick‘s hypothetical, the harm to resulting children is separable and after the fact of
their existence, whereas the harm in the examples from Part II is inherent in
the resulting children and cannot be avoided if they are to exist as the particular people that they are. Sperm donor anonymity is a possible exception because it is possible to conceive of such anonymity as a continual kind of child
abuse where the information is continually not released to the child and
thereby harming it. Is this a good argument for distinguishing the sperm donor anonymity case? In the environmental context, Axel Gosseries has proposed a reason to think so that he calls the ―‗Last Judgment‘‖ approach. Axel
Gosseries, On Future Generations‟ Future Rights, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 446, 460–61
(2008). Gosseries imagines a man trying to decide whether to bicycle or drive
his car home from work every day. He chooses to drive his car. Gosseries then
imagines that, many years later, the man‘s 17-year-old daughter, who is an
environmental activist, lambasts him for not bicycling and making the environment worse as a result. The man responds by stating: ―‗had I done so, you
would not be here.‘‖ Id. at 460. Had he used his bicycle, the man would have
come home at a different time each day and thus slept with his wife at a different time and produced a different child. The father continues: ―‗Since your
life in a polluted environment is still worth living, why blame me? I certainly
did not harm you.‘‖ Id.
Gosseries disagrees with the father. Id. at 461. He suggests that when
there is overlap between generations (at least to some degree), there may be
an asymmetry in the way the Non-Identity Problem immunizes pre- and postconception harms. ―As long as the father‘s pro-car choice was a necessary condition for his daughter‘s existence, it remains unobjectionable‖ such that ―his
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some work might offer us another way out. We might say that
the portion of children who will exist, irrespective of whether
child-abuse laws are put into place, is far greater than the portion whose existence is dependent on whether or not childabuse laws are put into place (i.e. the ones for whom there is a
Non-Identity Problem). Only a small number of parents like the
Hannigans might really not reproduce, or alter the timing or
partner for reproduction, unless allowed to abuse their child
with impunity. Therefore, in this hypothetical, the NonIdentity Problem is still imperfect, but much closer to the no
Non-Identity Problem pole of the continuum, and one could
conclude that the Hannigans are defensible casualties of an

preconception actions are immune to moral criticism when it comes to alleged
harms to his daughter.‖ Id. at 461. However, ―as soon as the daughter is conceived, all the father‘s subsequent actions no longer fall within the scope of the
non-identity context‖ such that ―we should expect the father to catch up as
soon as his daughter has been conceived in order to be able, at the end of his
life, to eventually meet‖ the obligations to her regarding the environment. Id.
Even if the harm to the environment the father has already done is irreversible, says Gosseries, ―he should act in such a way as to compensate for such
negative impacts through substitution measures (e.g., replacing an extinguished species with new energy-saving technology).‖ Id.
Similarly, can we make the claim that the parents who have sought to use
anonymous sperm donations should ―catch up‖ by revealing the child‘s identity
later on and that this justifies the legal prohibition on sperm donor anonymity? I think not. The existence of a legal obligation of the sperm donor to place
his name in a registry available to the child at age eighteen is what, as discussed above, is likely to alter donor and recipient behavior relating to when,
whether, or with whom they reproduce. Thus, a legally enforceable ―catch up‖
obligation ―feeds back‖ into the conception decision and thus is not immunized
from the Non-Identity Problem. Therefore, even in terms of sperm donor anonymity, the Non-Identity Problem blocks harm to the resulting child as serving as a justification for the sperm donor identification law.
Is Gosseries right as a moral matter at least? Can we at least say that
parents, who do not make available to their donor-conceived children the donors‘ identities, have acted immorally even if a legally enforceable obligation
would not be justified? The matter is less clear, but so long as a parent can
truthfully say ―if I knew I faced this moral obligation I would have not reproduced or I would have altered when or with whom I had reproduced, thereby
producing a different child‖—that is that he or she would make different reproductive decisions and thereby create a different child, then the same feedback problem seems to exist, even though what alters the behavior is a moral
and not legal obligation. For further discussion of this anticipation argument,
see Cohen, supra note 165.
To some extent, Gosseries‘ proposal parallels a different line of responses
to the Non-Identity Problem that I call ―Wronging While Overall Benefitting.‖
This response is exemplified by Seana Shiffrin‘s approach. Shiffrin, supra note
33. I discuss this approach in greater detail in a companion piece. Cohen, supra note 9.
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over-inclusive but justifiable rule.169 This is quite different than
the other cases we have discussed. Furthermore, one might
suggest that in this case the claimed parental interest—
abusing one‘s child—is due much less, if any, weight as compared to the procreative interests at issue in the cases discussed in Part II.170
C. NON-PERSON-AFFECTING PRINCIPLES
The Non-Identity Problem is an obstacle for any argument
that a restriction on whether, when, and with whom we reproduce is justified because it harms the child that is produced—
that is, for any argument premised on the idea that ―the individuals who experience suffering and limited opportunity in
169. This discussion may also provide a distinction between my cases and
the environmental context. While changes to the environment may cause some
variation in which individuals come into existence, the Non-Identity Problems
posed will be much further from the perfect pole than in the cases I have been
discussing, so more like the abuse hypothetical with the Hannigans. That is,
so long as there exists a significant population of individuals who would exist
whether or not the environmental intervention is put in place, harm to those
individuals would be a good reason to prevent the environmental degradation.
It is hard to imagine an environmental event that would completely (or nearly
completely) change when, whether, or with whom individuals reproduced. As
to such a hypothetical case where almost all future individuals will be different, it may be that there is no BIRC-type justification for acting to prevent it. I
intend my comments on the environmental case to be very tentative, in part
because there may be several important distinguishing characteristics. These
include the possibility that amoral value considerations like aesthetics may be
relevant, that the discontinuation of our entire species deserves special attention, or that most preventable environmental degradations are likely to negatively affect already-existing populations too such that BIRC may not be
needed as a justification and we can rely on a pure externalities argument.
170. That response takes us into the complicated question of whether consequentialist theories can endorse some form of preference-laundering, like
determining whether a sadist‘s preference to see others suffer ought to count
in determining welfare effects. See, e.g., L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS,
AND ETHICS 199–200 (1996) (―Does welfarism assign positive ethical value
to . . . the enjoyment of others‘ misfortune? Worse, what about the sadistic
pleasures of rapists or torturers?‖); Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173,
183–94 (2000) (considering how to disregard certain preferences and how to
―justify this ‗laundering of preferences‘‖). If we could, in advance, perfectly sort
who is serious about procreating only if they are allowed to commit child
abuse, should we have a rule exempting those people from the usual consequences? Such a regime might still be objectionable in that it produces an inequality that unjustly favors those whose reproduction is conditioned on being
able to abuse or out of moral hazard concerns that it might encourage parents
to form these preferences to avoid inculpation. In any event, such sorting
seems purely hypothetical.
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one alternative exist without those effects in the other alternative.‖171 However, there is a separate family of what are called
―non-person-affecting principles‖ which may be used to condemn the action.172 One such view suggests the world would be
better off if, instead of person A who will experience serious
suffering or limited opportunity coming into existence, person
B, who will not experience such limited opportunities or suffering, would come into existence—that is, ―[a]lthough the person
born with the condition in question would not have been
harmed by birth, the world is better off if a person without that
harm had been substituted in his place.‖173 Thus, on the nonperson-affecting principle ―[i]t is morally good to act in a way
that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity in the
world‖174 and therefore morally bad to act in a way that results
in more of those things. The parent who produces a child who
will experience serious suffering or limited opportunity has
done something morally wrong when that parent could have
produced a child who would not have experienced those
things.175
To illustrate, suppose that Desdemona engages in adult
brother-sister incest that produces Cal, a child who, due to genetic abnormality, psychological harm, or stigma, experiences
serious suffering and diminished opportunity. The Non-Identity
Problem tells us that the BIRC justification—that Cal is
harmed—cannot do the work of justifying restrictions that
would have prevented his birth. The non-person-affecting principle suggests that the wrongfulness of the act stems from Desdemona having given birth to Cal when she could have instead
had a different child in Cal‘s place with a non-incestual partner, a child who would not experience the suffering Cal does.
She could have done better, or perhaps more accurately, she
171. Brock, supra note 32, at 273.
172. See, e.g., id. at 272–73 (explaining and giving an example of the nonperson-affecting principle). Parfit himself introduces non-person-affecting
principles of the same variety immediately after presenting the Non-Identity
Problem. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 359–61, 364 –71. The term is a slight misnomer in that the suffering that is diminishing welfare will be experienced by
some person—it is not disembodied, it is just that the principle does not require the same person to suffer or not suffer based on the counterfactual; the
relevant distinction is between same-number and same-person cases. Brock,
supra note 32, at 273.
173. Robertson, supra note 32, at 16.
174. Brock, supra note 32, at 273.
175. Robertson, supra note 32, at 16.
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could have avoided doing so badly. In a sense, this approach
replaces Best Interests of the Resulting Child with Best Interests of the Resulting Population—BIRP (a term I would use if it
did not sound like indigestion).
The type of impersonal harm this argument invokes is very
unusual as a justification for criminal law intervention. Ordinarily, society intervenes with criminal sanctions because there
will be an identifiable ―victim‖ who is harmed or wronged, or, at
least, a statistical but not yet identified victim.176 Non-personaffecting principles posit that there can be wrongs that are ‗victimless,‘ not in the colloquial sense of having very attenuated
and indirect harms to people, as in the war on drugs, but where
truly no one is harmed. For under a non-person-affecting principle there is no one to lodge a first-person complaint against
the actor or feel indignation or resentment; instead the claim is
at the level of populations evaluated from an impersonal
standpoint: the world would be better if its population looked
like this rather than that.177
To forestall confusion, let me emphasize that the nonperson-affecting approach is not a claim that the intervention is
desirable for the sake of that other child. He will not be harmed
if he is not brought into existence. It is also not a claim that the
restriction on reproduction is justified because others in society
benefit or are harmed by the child‘s existence. That is a separate argument I discuss in a companion paper relating to reproductive externalities; the non-person-affecting principle by
contrasts says the action is wrongful even if those externalities
are zero.178 What is the non-person-affecting argument then? It

176. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 34–36 (discussing harming and
wronging). There are some tricky terminological nuances I self-consciously
gloss over here in that there can be acts that wrong a person without harming
him, or at least without harming him on balance. For more precision on these
terms, see id.
177. See Johann Frick, Future Persons and Victimless Wrongs (2002) (unpublished manuscript at 4), available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/jtb538/
Frick.pdf.
178. To clarify the distinction: There could be cases where reproduction will
produce a population that is better off from the non-person-affecting point of
view but which imposes externalities on already-existing individuals that
would not occur without the intervention. It is also possible to create a population that would produce fewer externalized costs on others, yet be worse off
from the non-person-affecting principle perspective. For example, creating a
population that was more likely to die at the age when they had paid into Social Security but before they needed to rely on social support might be better
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is a claim that the world is better off even though no person is
made better off; the world is better in an impersonal sense.179
To make it clear exactly what it would mean to reject the
non-person-affecting principle approach as a justification for
criminalizing certain reproductive conduct, I should emphasize
what doing so would not imply. It does not imply that the State
is prohibited from imposing criminal sanction to protect the interests of future persons who we know will exist and whose existence is independent of our sanction. Joel Feinberg gives an
imaginative example of a criminal who plants a time bomb in
the closet of a kindergarten and sets a timing device to go off
six years hence.180 Eventually, the bomb goes off, ―killing or
mutilating dozens of five-year-old children.‖181 As Feinberg
rightly concludes, even though the criminal might deny he
caused the harm to the children because they did not exist
when he performed the act of placing the bomb, that should be
no excuse because his act ―set in train a causal sequence that
led directly to the harm.‖182 Nothing I say in this Article is to
the contrary. What is important for the kindergarten case is
that there is no reason to think that whether or not we punish
the criminal will determine whether these children come into
existence. That is, it will not alter when, whether, or with
whom their parents conceive. Thus, there is no Non-Identity
Problem. These children will come into existence and these
children will be harmed if the act is not deterred through criminal liability. Our cases are different, though, for the reasons
we have been discussing throughout this Article—whether or
not we put in place criminal liability will determine whether
these particular children come into existence, thus we cannot
say that criminalizing the conduct prevents harm to these
children, as we can in the time bomb case. For the same reason,
rejecting criminal liability for the cases this Article discusses
does not require rejecting criminal liability for environmental

in terms of externalized costs, but would be worse on non-person-affecting
grounds because these individuals would face more limited opportunity.
179. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 369 (―If in either of two possible outcomes
the same number of people would ever live, it will be worse if those who live
are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have
lived.‖).
180. JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
12 (1992).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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damage or crimes against fetuses that will harm the children
those fetuses will become.183
With those clarifications in mind, we can now discuss the
non-person-affecting principle approach on its own terms. The
approach gives us a way to condemn reproductive practices like
those discussed in Part II that do not run afoul of the NonIdentity Problem. There are, however, a number of serious
challenges to using this approach as a justification for state interventions seeking to influence when, whether, and with
whom we reproduce. Here, I examine four kinds of critiques: (1)
does the limitation of the approach to same-number cases (if
justified) make it an inadequate substitute for BIRC; (2) is the
approach problematically underinclusive; (3) is the approach
sensible even as a criterion of moral wrongfulness, or does it
carry with it problematic implications; and (4) can the approach
even justify criminal sanctions? Each of these is a separate concern regarding this approach that collectively suggest it to be a
poor substitute for BIRC in justifying these interventions.
1. The Limitation to Same-Number Cases
The most serious concern with the non-person-affecting
principle approach is that, on its face, it can only justify a much
smaller subset of the interventions from Part II than BIRC
aims to justify. According to Brock and Parfit, non-personaffecting principles have built in to them the limitation that
they apply only to ―same-number‖ cases—where the same
number of persons exist in either counterfactual and we merely
substitute the person who would experience more opportunity
or less suffering (i.e. the higher welfare person) for the one who
would experience less opportunity or more suffering (i.e. the
lower welfare person).184 This is to be contrasted with ―differ-

183. What to think about harm-to-fetus cases would depend on a separate
question of one‘s criterion for the continuity of personal identity between fetuses and the children they become, and whether or not changes in personal
identity of this sort are sufficient to create a Non-Identity Problem. See Cohen,
supra note 19, at 354 –59. There are similar, but even more difficult, questions
about whether Non-Identity Problems occur from genetic manipulations of
pre-embryos, as I have also discussed elsewhere. Id. at 357. In other words,
one can support criminal liability as to the fetal or pre-embryonic cases but
reject it as to the cases I discuss here.
184. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 360–61; Brock, supra note 32, at 273.
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ent-number cases‖ where, if the intervention is put in place, a
different number of children will come into existence.185
It is only in same-number cases that the non-person affecting principle approach can declare that the world is better off
from an impersonal standpoint if the substitution takes place.
The reason offered by Brock and his colleagues is that while the
―intuitive point underlying [the non-person-affecting principle]
is that it is good to prevent suffering and promote happiness
even if doing so reduces no person‘s suffering and increases no
person‘s happiness,‖ when that principle is applied to ―different-number cases, that implies Parfit‘s Repugnant Conclusion.‖186 The Repugnant Conclusion is that ―[f]or any possible
population of at least ten billion people, all with very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better,
even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.‖187 That is, if we extend the principle we have been discussing to ―cases with different numbers of persons,‖ that would
―imply we should increase total happiness slightly by vastly increasing the population, even though we thereby make every
existing person much worse off,‖ and it is only ―person-affecting
principles [that] seem likely to avoid unacceptable implications
like the Repugnant conclusion, since only they require that a
reduction in suffering or an increase in happiness be to a distinct individual.‖188
Let me unpack that a bit. As part of a consequentialist
theory—I will use utilitarianism here instead of other variants
of consequentialism for explanatory simplicity189—one could
have two quite different views about how to aggregate utility
between persons. Total utilitarians would sum up the utility of
every individual in the set such that (to use fictional numbers)
a population of 100,000 people with utility of five each would be
more desirable than a population of 50,000 people with utility
five each; by contrast average utilitarians would divide all utili-

185. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 360–61 (contrasting ―Same Number Choices‖
with ―Different Number Choices‖).
186. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254.
187. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 388.
188. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254 –55.
189. Deontologists face a similar problem as well, since they often begin
with a commitment to pursuing the Good, but merely add constraints and
options.
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ty by the number of individuals in the population such that
both of those hypothetical populations are equally desirable.190
Different numbers cases might be thought of as coming in
two variants, those that will produce fewer children (including
zero) and those that will produce more children. Those policies
that will produce fewer children—all the regulations affecting
whether individuals reproduce directly have this effect, and
many of the regulations of when, and with whom individuals
reproduce may de facto have this effect as discussed above—
should be disfavored by a total utilitarian as long as the resulting children will have lives worth living. So long as the child‘s
life will have positive utility (i.e. a life worth living), it is always better for there to come into existence one additional child
for they add to the total utility. Thus, on the total utilitarian
view, a non-person-affecting principle cannot ordinarily support
regulating reproduction when it produces fewer children,191 as
most of the interventions from Part II actually do, and these interventions should thus be disfavored.

190. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 113 (1979) (discussing the difference between
average and total utilitarianism and the debate between scholars on which
type to use).
191. I say ―ordinarily‖ because this conclusion is only completely assured in
cases where the intervention reduces the existing set of children to zero or
where the welfare of the children born is independent. One could at least conceive of an intervention that, instead of producing three children who each
have a utility of seven, produced two children who have utilities of six and
twenty respectively. In such a case the total utilitarian would favor the intervention because it produces a greater utility. While there is no reason to think
any of the interventions I am discussing would have this structure, it is important to be precise.
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Diagram 4

However, it is exactly the total utilitarian reasoning that
threatens to lead to the Repugnant Conclusion which is illustrated in the top half of Diagram 4: we could vastly expand our
population from the bar on the left (seven billion people with
utility five each = thirty-five billion total utility) to the bar on
the right (eighty billion people with utility .5 each = forty billion total utility). This would result in a much larger number of
people with lives just barely worth living, thus increasing total
utility but producing people with much worse lives than we
currently have. Thus, these forms of regulation cannot be justified in different-number cases on non-person-affecting principles if one is a total utilitarian; but being a total utilitarian
also seems to lead to an unacceptable conclusion.192
192. I say ―seems‖ because one option would be to accept the Repugnant
Conclusion as not so repugnant after all. See, e.g., Torbjörn Tännsjö, Why We
Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion, 14 UTILITAS 339 (2002). I will not
examine this possibility here, except to suggest that some of the intuitive repugnance of the conclusion may stem from improperly thinking of our population actually becoming the other one in which case our own lives would actually be made less good rather than a scenario in which we imagine choosing
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One might argue that this conclusion can be evaded by accepting average rather than total utility as a measure of what
makes a state of the world better: a non-person-affecting principle approach premised on average utilitarianism can support
these kinds of regulations in different-number cases because
the additional children whose existence the regulation seeks to
prevent, while adding to the total utility in the world will, if
―below-average,‖ lower the average utility in the world.193 Thus,
on the average utilitarian version of the non-person-affecting
principle, reproducing in such circumstances is wrong because
it lowers average utility. However, average utilitarianism also
appears to lead us to a different kind of repugnant conclusion,
which Parfit calls the ―Mere Addition Paradox‖ (represented in
the lower half of Diagram 4), that the world would be better if
Adam and Eve, both with a very high utility, existed alone than
if in addition to Adam and Eve there also existed fifty billion
other people with very good lives but utilities just below Adam
and Eve (say 9.99999999 repeating).194 That is, the latter world
is a worse one, since the addition of these people has diminished the average from what it was with just Adam and Eve
existing. This conclusion seems wrong. Indeed, perhaps still
more strangely the average utilitarian should be indifferent as
to Adam and Eve, each with utility ten, existing versus Adam
and Eve plus fifty billion other people, all with utility ten, existing, for in each case the average utility is exactly the same.
Both Brock and Parfit candidly admit that the only way to
avoid both of these paradoxes is to provide a comprehensive
theory that mixes person-affecting and non-person-affecting
principles—they call it ―Theory X‖—but that no such comprehensive theory has yet been formulated.195 Therefore, Brock
and his co-authors limit the scope of the application of nonperson-affecting principles to same-number cases.196 The implibetween creating one population or the other ab initio. Accepting the Repugnant Conclusion and total utilitarianism would appear to stack the deck further against the interventions in Part II, for it would favor producing more
children and not fewer. I will discuss these matters further in a Beyond Best
Interests, when discussing reproductive externality approaches. See Cohen,
supra note 9.
193. See Robertson, supra note 32, at 17 (providing reasons to use average
utilitarianism when the numbers differ).
194. See PARFIT, supra note 32, at 419–21.
195. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254 –55; PARFIT, supra note 32, at
390.
196. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254 –55.
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cation for our purposes is that only in same-number, but not
different-number cases, can we say that the world is impersonally better without leading to conclusions about other cases
we find intuitively unacceptable. The same/different-number
distinction usefully maps on to one dimension of the taxonomy I
developed in Part I. Attempts to target whether individuals reproduce are by definition not same-numbers cases and therefore unjustifiable by this framework. The limitation runs deeper, however, because interventions targeting with whom or
when we reproduce may de facto lead to no reproduction at all.
For example bans on commercialized surrogacy, refusal to contractually enforce surrogacy agreements, and prohibitions of
donor anonymity, may result in shortages of sperm or eggs or
surrogates or reluctance of prospective parent to reproduce on
these terms.
As to this de facto point, let me dwell on one way in which
my account differs subtly from that of Parfit and Brock. They
are concerned with the morality of certain reproductive decisions that may produce children who are less well-off than they
could have been. From the point of view of whether a parent
acted morally wrong, they propose as a test of whether we are
in a same-numbers case whether the parents could have substituted a better-off child for the worse-off one, with the idea being
that if they could they failed by not doing so. Even at the level
of what is meant by could I think there are some hard questions,197 but the larger point here is that, when we are asking
197. Brock and his co-authors use an example of two parents who are ―virtually certain to genetically transmit the disability to any child they conceive‖
such that ―[i]f they choose not to have a child with a disability and can have no
other child instead, the result is one fewer children—a different-number case.‖
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 255. Suppose, however, that it is only the
combination of both parents‘ genetic material that produces the disabled child;
could they not avoid that result by using one of their gametes along with
sperm or egg donated from a third-party? Even if they each had genetic material certain to produce the disability, could they not still produce a healthy
child with the mother serving as gestational parent and using both donated
sperm and egg? John Robertson has suggested that even in cases like these
where we could make same-number substitutions, we may want to make an
exception and not treat the failure to substitute as wrongful if it ―unreasonably burden[s] parents,‖ and has suggested as examples cases where it would
―require that the parents give up having a genetically related child and accept
childlessness, adoption, or use of a gamete donor.‖ Robertson, supra note 32, at
16–17. Whether we ought to make an exception for such cases on the ―could‖
view should depend, in part, on prior normative judgments about the value of
having genetically related children. See generally Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 5, at 1189–90 (discussing parental adoption preferences); Cohen, su-
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what interventions a state motivated by non-person-affecting
principles ought to adopt, the question should subtly shift from
one of whether these parents could have made a same-number
substitution to whether they will make such substitutions if
the intervention is put in place. If the intervention has the actual effect of reducing the number of children born rather than
inducing same-number substitutions, the State cannot pursue
it in the name of non-person-affecting principles since we cannot say the world has been made better off in an impersonal
sense with the intervention in place.198
For these reasons, until we develop Theory X, the nonperson-affecting principle approach is at most only a limited
substitute for BIRC reasoning because it extends only to samenumber cases and thus excludes many of the examples in
Part II.
This is such a significant limitation to a non-personaffecting approach that it would be desirable to be able to relax
it and show that non-person-affecting principles could apply
even in some different-number cases. Adopting a proposal put
forth by Thomas Hurka in the adjacent field of population ethics, Philip Peters has recently proposed a theory that combines
average and total utility as a way to avoid both the Repugnant
Conclusion and the Mere Addition Paradox and thus allow the
use of this framework in some different-number cases.199 On

pra note 19 (discussing tort liability for parents who intentionally have a disabled child).
198. While I think this is right, the point is not self-evident and may depend on whether one views the intervention through a more retributivistic
lens or as a more consequentialist attempt at influencing social policy. If one
adopts the more retributivistic perspective, it is possible to conclude that person has acted immorally by failing to substitute for another child, and that
even if the intervention is put in place they will not actually substitute, and
that they should be punished because they have acted wrongfully. On this
view, punishment is warranted for a wrongful action, even though it is a
wrongful action the possibility of punishment would not have prevented. I am
not attracted to this position, in which individuals are punished in the name of
non-person-affecting principles even though the intervention does not make
the world better from an impersonal standpoint, but others may be. In any
event, this perspective may be much better suited for defending criminal law
interventions where retributivist impulses have a larger role to play. Yet, as I
explain below, criminal law interventions may be the hardest to defend on the
non-person-affecting principle approach for separate reasons.
199. Philip G. Peters, Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State
Regulation of Reproductive Liberty, in 35 HARMING FUTURE PERSONS: ETHICS,
GENETICS, AND THE NONIDENTITY PROBLEM 317, 326 ( MELINDA A. Roberts &
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this theory ―total utility declines in importance relative to average utility as populations increase‖ such that ―the value that
an additional individual contributes to the world is not constant, but varies with the number of other humans alive‖ so
that after a crisis that decimated our population the value of an
additional person‘s existence would be huge while as the population reaches its current size the value of an additional person
would greatly diminish.200 Peters writes that this approach attractively avoids the Repugnant Conclusion ―by giving more
weight to average utility when population levels are high.‖201
Although he does not make this point, so long as total utility
always retains some weight in the calculus the view also avoids
one version of the Mere Addition Paradox in that adding an individual with identical utility to all other individuals (leaving
the average unchanged) remains preferable because total utility acts at the very least as a ―tie breaker.‖ How this solution
does with another version of the Mere Addition Paradox, say a
population that looks like ours with average utility of ten versus a population that is twice as large but with just slightly less
average utility (9.99999), is less clear and would depend on
precisely how much total gives way to average utility and at
what point.
Peters is to be congratulated for making such a clever and
subtle addition to this literature, but how good of a solution is
this to the different-number cases, really? Determining the
right mix of total and average utility to precisely avoid these
paradoxes seems to construct a bit of a ―just-so story.‖ Perhaps
it is only by reflecting on such intuitions that one can determine the proper shape of a utilitarian theory, but while the intuitions behind Total and Average Utilitarian approaches are
quite clear, the intuitions behind this theory are less than pellucid. In any event, it seems to me that the bigger deficit with
the theory is that it errs in identifying what it is we think is
wrong in reproduction when we think it wrong. Because the
theory calls on us to heavily weight average utility when the
population is the size of ours, it means that the wrongfulness of
a reproductive act depends on whether the child created is
above or below the average utility of all other existing individ-

David T. Wasserman eds. 2009) (citing Thomas Hurka, Value and Population
Size, 93 ETHICS 496 (1983)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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uals—but that seems deeply counterintuitive. Why should the
wrongfulness of my reproductive activity be measured relative
to that of other reproducers in my society? Because we are in a
different-number case it is not an argument that I could have
done better by substitution but instead an acknowledgment
that, although I could not have done better, because others did
do better, my act is wrong.202 Why treat the average as the morally significant baseline? The average utility of the world is
quite different today than in 1850, which means that producing
the same child could be morally permissible in 1850 but morally impermissible today.
Consider your own life. Most of us think that our parents
did not act wrongly by producing us. And yet this approach
would suggest that to know if that is right we would have to
compare our utility with that of all other persons in society at
the moment of our birth, and if we fall below the mean our existence could validly (indeed should) have been prohibited. Indeed, if tomorrow, other parents begin having children with
much higher utility than our own utility, then our reproduction
which was permissible today would suddenly become wrongful
tomorrow, notwithstanding that no fact about our own lives has
changed. This seems deeply troubling and so out of sorts with
our conceptions of what makes particular acts of reproduction
wrongful as to be a serious mark against Peters‘s otherwise
elegant solution, or any approach with a high weighting of average utility.
Thus, I conclude that the limitation of non-person-affecting
principles to same-number cases (and the concomitant narrowing of regulations on reproduction the non-person-affecting
principle can support) persists. This represents a serious mark
against the non-person-affecting approach to the extent it is offered as an adequate BIRC substitute, ruling it out for many
(the whether interventions), if not all (many of the when and
with whom interventions), in Part II.203
202. This distinguishes and sharpens the critique from one I make regarding enhancement. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.a. There, the problematic
implication is that we do wrong by failing to enhance, to substitute for enhanced children in same-number cases, when we can do so. Here the claim is
that we act wrongly by failing to have average or above-average children even
when we cannot do so, and thus the State can validly prevent us from having
any children at all.
203. To be clear, neither Brock nor Parfit argues that non-person-affecting
principles are a total substitute for person-affecting ones and intends them to
compliment not supplement person-affecting approaches. What I have shown,
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2. Underinclusivity
Even if non-person-affecting principles are limited to justifying purely same-number substitution interventions, or if this
limitation is overcome, there are several other reasons why this
framework seems inadequate, to which I now turn.
Deploying the non-person-affecting principle argument to
defend the interventions of Part II shows them to be problematically underinclusive. There are many forms of reproduction
producing comparable (or worse) non-person-affecting principle
deficits where no such intervention has been imposed. If many
of us would reject intervention in those cases, and those cases
cannot meaningfully be distinguished, that casts doubt about
how good this reformulation is as a BIRC substitute.
To wit, the genetic abnormalities resulting from brothersister incest are less likely to result and also less serious in
terms of their effects on the population of resulting children
than those that result from the mating of carriers of Tay-Sachs
or a number of other genetic disorders. And yet our government
has not required mandatory screening for these disorders—an
intervention which is less liberty-intrusive as to particular individuals than the criminalization of brother-sister incest since
it would merely force individuals to have the information, not
control their sexual relationships—and it certainly has not
made it illegal for Tay-Sachs carriers to reproduce. If you think
that brother-sister incest may be unique on legal moralistic
grounds, the same point could be made as to many of the other
interventions I have discussed. Another example comes from
the alleged effects on child welfare of single parenthood: the
harms that it is claimed will occur from single parenthood will
be the same whether it arises coitally or through reproductive
technology, such that someone who defends a restriction on reproductive technology use by single individuals ought also apply the same limit on coital reproduction intended to give rise
to single parenthood.
Underinclusivity might not be normatively problematic if
there were meaningful distinctions between what is regulated
and left unregulated, perhaps drawing on the difficulty and intrusiveness of attempts to regulate natural reproductive (as
opposed to assisted reproductive) behavior. That response,
however, fails to perfectly capture the current line of regulation
though, is that I do not think they can replace BIRC (which will not work for
reasons discussed) in justifying these interventions.
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in that we have in fact directly regulated adult sexual activity
by criminalizing brother-sister incest while leaving alone procreative activities that portend much more certain and significant non-person-affecting harms, so we ought to be cautious before fully buying into this possible distinction.204
One might argue that the interests that would be set back
in the natural reproduction context are weightier than those in
the artificial reproduction context; state interference with sexual intimacy is more noxious than preventing an individual
from receiving a particular type of medical assistance necessary
to reproduce. Is that right? As a number of authors have suggested, the natural/artificial line ought to carry no weight.205 I
suspect that views to the contrary are the product of misfires of
intuitions on positive versus negative liberty; they are misfires
because both preventing access to reproductive technology and
preventing coital reproduction are negative liberty violations. If
governments restricted themselves to selective funding of assisted reproduction it would not be underinclusive because that
is a positive liberty intervention, but my point holds for most of
the other means.
One might try to more defensibly distinguish subcategories of assisted reproductive technology use, for example
by hiving-off assisted reproduction involving the gametes of
partners in an intimate relationship from that using the gametes of strangers to that relationship. Whether that move is
persuasive depends on one‘s valuation of different forms of procreative and parental autonomy. This is a big question, and one
that deserves its own article, so I will just confine myself to a
couple of brief remarks. The philosopher Daniel Statman has
described the interest in reproduction as:
the desire to achieve a kind of immortality by continuing to live
through descendants, the desire to live vicariously through one‘s
children, getting a second chance, as it were, the desire for the deep
and enduring intimate relations that one hopes to achieve with one‘s
offspring, the longing for a home, a nest, a secure place with a close

204. That said, one might avoid this problem by decriminalizing brothersister adult incest but retaining the other interventions discussed or by arguing that the brother-sister incest case is special and criminalization is justified by a quite different and independent reason, such as the Legal Moralism I
sketch below. See infra notes 221–23.
205. Robertson, supra note 32, at 31–36; Statman, supra note 16, at 228
(―There seems to be no relevant difference between natural and artificial procreation that could explain why the former should enjoy a stronger protection
than the other.‖).
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network of relationships in which one belongs, and, in addition, the
interest of couples to found a family. 206

On one reading of that list, only reproduction by those
without any genetic tie to the offspring (none of the cases in
Part II) is distinguished. On a different reading, reproduction
that involves even one non-intimate partner (single, lesbian or
gay parents, commercialized surrogacy) is justified because of
the lower status of the interests represented by that kind of
procreation. Would we be right in thinking that for the interest
to be worth protecting, there must be a perfect overlap between
the genetic partners, romantic partners, and rearing partners?
Certainly some religious conceptions of procreation that condemn it outside of marriage view reproduction as worthy because it unifies an already existing romantic relationship, but
that is a conception against which many of us would chaff.
Even if this kind of move succeeds (and I am not at all sure it
does) it still would not defend drawing the line between coital
and assisted reproduction as such; instead it would counsel
making a division between reproduction by single parents,
however it is achieved, and reproduction by intimate partners.
Thus, the underinclusivity seems to persist and demands that
we either reject some of the interventions in Part II or add prohibitions on their coital equivalents. If we are unwilling to do
so, that is some reason to doubt the non-person-affecting principle approach as a sufficient justification.
3. The Soundness of the Non-Person-Affecting Principle
Approach as a Moral Criterion
Putting aside underinclusivity, and even as to cases involving genuine same-number substitutions, there is a further
question as to whether the non-person-affecting approach is
problematic on its own terms. I will only briefly touch on two
objections that relate to enhancement and eugenics.
a. Enhancement
The first objection is that the non-person-affecting principle proves too much in that it ought to justify not only the
moral wrongfulness of reproductive decisions to avoid what I
have elsewhere called diminishment207—producing a child who
is on balance significantly worse-off as compared to the ‗normal‘
206. Statman, supra note 16, at 226.
207. Cohen, supra note 19.
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child (scare quotes to emphasize the normative baggage behind
such labeling), a child who will ―experience serious suffering or
limited opportunity‖208—but also a duty to engage in enhancement—to produce a child who is, on balance, significantly better-off as compared to the normal child. This point is suggested
by the Oxford philosopher Julian Savulescu (although he does
not treat it as a problem) who argues for a ―moral obligation to
have the best children‖ that he calls the principle of ―Procreative Beneficence‖: ―couples (or single reproducers) should select
the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.‖209 If the
world would be worse, in an impersonal sense, if there comes
into existence a child who experiences more serious suffering
and loss of opportunity, than if there comes into existence a
child who experiences the normal amount of these things, why
would it not be even better with children who experience still
less of these things than the normal child? This too can be
thought of as an underinclusivity problem, with the State‘s actions being problematic in taking steps to prevent parents diminishing their children but not pushing parents to enhance,
when under non-person-affecting principles the two are equivalent. Otherwise put, this is a baseline problem familiar to legal
academics that asks why the level of serious suffering, happiness, or opportunity of the normal child today is normatively
significant.
Notice, though, what adopting a duty to enhance would
mean: it is not enough to avoid an incestuous reproductive
partner, one would have failed in one‘s duty if one did not
choose as good a reproductive partner for one‘s child as possible. It is not enough to abstain from reproductive sex during
one‘s adolescent years, instead a woman might fail in her duty

208. Brock, supra note 32, at 273. It is worth noting that if we take seriously the qualifier ―serious‖ that may in and of itself rule out the use of this argument for a large number of the interventions discussed in Part II since
whatever possible setbacks could be avoided in an impersonal sense by substitution do not rise to the level of being ―serious‖ ones.
209. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the
Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413, 415 (2001). While Savulescu seems to equivocate between choosing a child with the ―the best life‖ and one with ―at least
as good a life as the others,‖ the logic of the non-person-affecting principle and
his argument suggests it should be the former. Id. But see Rosamund Scott,
Why Parents Have No Duty to Select „the Best‟ Children, 2 CLINICAL ETHICS
149, 151 (2007) (noting this implication of Savulescu‘s approach).
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to her child unless she waits until her career, wealth, etc., are
in the ideal position for child-rearing. And, if genetic enhancements improving the lives of the children who result are possible, one who fails to use them would have failed in this duty.
Unlike Savulescu, who views this implication as commonsensical, I believe that if endorsing non-person-affecting principles
required this conclusion that would be a reason not to endorse
them.
Still more troubling is what this means for legal regulation
of reproduction. If, in spite of my objections in this Part, one
takes the non-person-affecting principle approach to justify legal regulation of reproduction for cases involving diminishment, and the non-person-affecting principle approach does not
distinguish diminishment and enhancement, then legal regulation (including criminal sanction) of reproduction to force enhancement is equally justified.210
Can the non-person-affecting principle approach avoid that
implication? It is not clear. One response is that some amount
of suffering or diminished opportunity is good for children.
That is a contestable empirical claim, but even granting it
would merely lop off the extreme end of the continuum: insofar
as there are enhancements which improve children‘s lives but
not past this threshold of a too-protected population we have a
duty to enhance, and the state would be justified in enforcing
it. This would still generate a robust duty to enhance unless by
some ―just-so story‖ we think that children currently get just
the right amount of suffering and lack of opportunity, which
seems implausible.
A different set of responses suggests that the diminishment-enhancement distinction maps on to act-omission distinctions in American law, or that the relevant distinction is between those committed to a maximization thesis and those who
adopt a sufficientarian approach. I take up both of these claims
as to the Reproductive Externalities argument in a companion
paper,211 and will not repeat my objections here but instead direct the interested reader to that discussion.
210. Interestingly, while Savulescu endorses the idea that doctors should
―attempt[ ] to persuade [ parents] to have the best child they can,‖ he actually
dismisses off-hand the possibility of state intervention because of ―the presumption in favour of liberty in liberal democracies.‖ Savulescu, supra note
209, at 425. This may just mean he implicitly accepts my claim that nonperson affecting principles cannot justify restrictions on liberty.
211. Cohen, supra note 9.
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A different response is that enhancements are distinguishable in practice because there are safety or theological concerns
with genetic manipulation,212 because some enhancements are
not good for the child (to the extent they allow parents to hegemonically foreclose certain avenues for the child instead of securing a ―right to an open future‖),213 because we lack sufficient
foresight to pick good traits,214 or because the availability of
enhancements problematically exacerbates inequalities between those who have access to enhancing technologies and
those who do not.215 Even assuming arguendo that these points
were true as to all genetic enhancements, the arguments seem
less apposite as to the duties towards nongenetic forms of ―enhancement‖ that parallel our cases (delaying reproduction,
choosing particular reproductive partners, etc).
The most plausible way I can imagine to distinguish diminishment and enhancement in this context would instead point
to the comparative burdensomeness of the two principles as restrictions on our autonomy to pursue important life projects:
that Savulescu‘s principle of procreative beneficence will impose much greater constraints relative to Brock‘s more limited
non-person-affecting principle. However, the assumption that
the enhancement/diminishment line maps neatly on to the
more-burdensome/less-burdensome one is problematic. There
are some forms of enhancement that would require a fairly
small restriction on liberty (for example, taking a particular dietary supplement once a week while pregnant that is shown to
improve the intelligence of resulting children beyond the normal range) while there are some actions one would need to take
to avoid diminishment that will involve significant limitations
on one‘s life choices (for example, being unable to reproduce as
a single or same-sex individual, or being subject to criminal
sanction unless one chooses a reproductive partner other than
one‘s genetic sibling with whom one is in love).216 If what matters to us is the level of restriction in relation to how much better the world would be in an impersonal sense, it might be better to draw the line on that criterion directly rather than using
212. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF
HUMAN CLONING 3, 17–24 (Leon R. Kass & James Q. Wilson eds., 1998).
213. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 170–72.
214. Id. at 179–82.
215. See id. at 187–91.
216. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 91–94 (discussing a similar point in
criminal law).
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the enhancement-distinction as a muddled heuristic. That
would, however, still allow the state to legally require some enhancements.
It is still open to us to take the other horn of the dilemma
and accept a symmetrical duty to enhance such that the State
can justifiably use the same legal interventions as in Part II,
not only to induce substitutions of ‗normal‘ for diminished
children but also to induce the substitution of enhanced children for ‗normal‘ ones. For some, this implication of the nonperson-affecting principle approach may be unsettling enough
to justify rejecting it. For others, the intuitive discomfort of
supporting legally enforceable duties to enhance can be mitigated by introducing limiting principles such as requiring extremely large non-person-affecting benefits and the least intrusive of the means of influencing the target reproductive
decision (see Table 1 above). However, whatever cabining we
must do on the enhancement side to make the non-personaffecting principle approach plausible ought to apply equally on
the diminishment side. I believe many of the interventions justified by BIRC will not be supportable on the non-personaffecting principle, when appropriately cabined.
b. The Specter of the New Eugenics
A different kind of concern with the non-person-affecting
principle approach as a substitute for BIRC is that it relies on
objectionable eugenic premises. Expressively it threatens to
suggest to a member of the set of individuals it targets (or at
least to the children who sneak past its gates and come into existence): ―we are expending state resources to prevent people
like you from coming into existence because we think the world
is better off if people like you (physically disabled, mentally retarded, raised by gay or single parents, etc.) were replaced by
other people.‖ This is a far cry from the goal of preventing harm
to vulnerable populations that underlies much of the appeal of
BIRC reasoning. This is not to say that such reasoning is necessarily invalid, but it does require a direct confrontation with
the eugenics movements of old and the question of what made
the ―old‖ eugenics wrong?
Eugenics was the term coined by Darwin‘s cousin Francis
Galton for the ―science of improving stock—not only by judicious mating, but whatever tends to give the more suitable rac-
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es or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing over the less
suitable than they otherwise would have had.‖217 In the first
half of the 1900s, Galton‘s ideas spread as both a research program and a social movement to Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Brazil, Denmark, and even the United States218—
where the Race Better Foundation headed by John Kellogg attracted ten thousand visitors at the Panama-Pacific exposition
of 1915219 and the American Museum of Natural History hosted
large exhibits in 1915 and 1932 220—and it was popular in the
inter-war era not only among conservatives, but also Progressives and Scandinavian Social Democrats who sought to use
eugenic reasoning as the basis for the social welfare state.221 In
U.S. law it is most famously associated with Justice Holmes‘s
claim in Buck v. Bell that ―[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough‖ as a reason to uphold a Virginia policy of involuntarily
sterilizing an allegedly ―feeble-minded‖ who had already produced one ―feeble-minded‖ child.222 Eugenics was notorious as a
central part of the Nazi movement that seized on the notion of
blood and called for the purification of the nation‘s gene pool in
order to ―regain the nobility and greatness of their genetically
pure forebears,‖ and gave rise to prohibitions on sexual relations between Jews and Aryans, ―Genetic Courts passing judgment on [] genetic fitness,‖ marriage advice clinics, and ultimately mass sterilization and euthanasia programs targeting
―Jews and other minorities.‖223
While the rationale of the non-person-affecting principle
sounds a lot like that of the old eugenics movement, as Buchanan and his co-authors caution, ―the central theses of a social
movement, including its moral premises, ought not be dismissed because of the intellectual and ethical failings of its adherents.‖224 Yes, ―[e]ugenics is recalled as the Nazis‘ racial doctrine, which it was, but to be a eugenicist, then or now, is not

217. See BUCHANAN, ET AL., supra note 32, at 30. For an excellent comprehensive history of eugenics, see generally DIANE PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN
HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT (1998).
218. PAUL, supra note 217, at 31.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 32–37.
222. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927).
223. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 38– 40.
224. Id. at 45.
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tantamount to being a Nazi,‖ or at least not necessarily.225 In
more colloquial terms, we ought to be wary of trying to score
points by comparing our opponents to Nazis.
Tracing what was and was not wrong with the eugenics
movement is a book-length project. Here, I limit myself to briefly examining two possible ways in which what we might call
the ―new‖ eugenics—the means of state intervention in reproductive decision-making discussed in Part II—might be justified and distinguished from the old eugenics of the Nazis.
The first distinction would focus on the means used to regulate reproduction rather than the reasons for that use. The
Nazi eugenics movement used murder and sterilization as some
of its primary means of controlling reproduction.226 One could
argue that the old eugenics‘ badness departs from the evils of
those means not used by the new eugenics.
I do not find this distinction persuasive. To be sure, involuntary sterilization involves an invasion of bodily integrity, a
kind of interest that is often accorded particular normative and
constitutional protection.227 But it seems to be a fetishization of
bodily integrity to say the imposition of criminal sanction to
achieve the same ends is not equally objectionable. To use an
extreme example, can we really conclude that an attempt to
criminalize all reproductive activity by Jews or Gypsies would
be appreciably less abhorrent than achieving that same result
through sterilization? The Nazis did both after all, and on some
accounts one might even conclude that sterilization is the lessbad alternative.
That said, while distinctions between sterilization and criminalization seem insufficient to do the work of avoiding the
badness of the old eugenics, things are less clear as to some of
the other less intrusive means. Imagine the State decided not
to enforce surrogacy contracts only as to a category of parents
who were likely to produce significant non-person-affecting
harms—some states already refuse judicial pre-clearance (and
thus enforcement) of surrogacy agreements when the intending
parents are not a married heterosexual couple.228 Or suppose
that instead the State sought to fund abstinence education programs that target only particular subgroups likely to produce
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
See id. at 37.
See, e.g., Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 5, at 1156.
See Daar, supra note 86, at 43.
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these non-person-affecting harms, for example those with heritable disabilities such as deafness. This would certainly be less
bad than involuntarily sterilization, but even the funding of informational interventions to dissuade reproduction carries with
it a worrisome message. And while one might distinguish the
message ―your existence is so unworthy that it should be prevented‖ from ―your existence reduces welfare from an impersonal standpoint compared to the children who might have
been born in your place,‖ that distinction is one that is likely to
be lost on most listeners. Still, at least for the less intrusive
means, this may offer some room between the new and old eugenics.
A second distinction would suggest that the badness of the
old eugenics movement stemmed from its targeting of genetic
unfitness and the transmission of genes as the source of harm.
If one accepts even a moderate form of genetic essentialism in
which one‘s genes are at least partially constitutive of who one
is, this constituted a deep rejection of the person—―we want to
prevent the existence of future people like you.‖ By contrast, at
least some of the examples discussed in Part II focus on preventing children from coming into being whose rearing conditions (single parent, unaware of parent‘s identity, etc.) are bad
on non-person-affecting grounds. Even the criminalization of
brother-sister adult incest where the harm results (at least in
part) from genetic abnormalities might be rationalized not as a
rejection of the person and their genetic make-up but merely as
a condemnation of their reproduction with a particular other
person—though here the move may be too clever by half since
the worry is that each of the two people may carry a ―bad‖ recessive gene. If a necessary condition of the wrongfulness of the
old eugenics was the condemnation of the reproducing person
this too may distinguish the new eugenics.
Although tempting, such a distinction is slippery in that
while these examples may not require condemning a person as
a repository of genes, in some instances they do nonetheless
condemn the person. Individuals are condemned for reproducing when gay, single, of a certain age, etc., because of the welfare of populations that will result. Why is that less troubling
than the condemnation of the individual because of their genetic make-up leading to the same effect? Holding this line might
require a very strong form of genetic essentialism or perhaps
some form of luck egalitarianism—the idea that individuals
should not be held responsible for brute luck things they could
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not help (such as genetic traits) but should be held responsible
for option luck choices they do make.229 The old eugenics problematically limited the reproductive liberty of individuals because their reproduction had consequences they could not help,
the argument goes, but the new eugenics penalizes them only
for decisions that fall within option luck. Such a defense would
require overcoming many of the stock objections to luck egalitarianism,230 as well as maintaining the brute-option luck distinction as to these cases, which seems quite difficult. Some
(not conclusive) research suggests that at least one case—that
of restrictions on LGBT access to reproductive technologies—
might involve at least partially genetically determined ‗choices‘
moving it to the brute luck and therefore bad eugenics side.231
Many of the other cases—one‘s propensity to become a teenage
mother, one‘s attraction to a sibling, whether one is single—
might be thought to have many brute luck elements to them
even though not genetic brute luck. To the extent we are restricting individuals from reproducing due to criteria that are
not their fault, the gap between the ―new‖ and ―old‖ eugenics
thus narrows.
For all these reasons, I find the difficulty in distinguishing
the practices discussed in Part II from the old eugenics to constitute an additional problem faced by the non-person-affecting
principle view as BIRC substitute, but perhaps not as serious a
problem as the others I have outlined above.
4. Can Criminal Law Restrictions on Reproduction be
Justified by Non-Person-Affecting Principles?
A more fundamental, but admittedly more contestable objection, is that even if we concede that non-person-affecting
principles make one of the actions discussed in Part II wrongful
in a moral sense, it is not the kind of wrong the law may justifiably target through criminal sanction on reproductive activities.
One might think that to justify the serious restriction on
liberty posed by criminal sanctions on reproduction requires a
229. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETH287, 291 (1999); Nir Eyal, Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice, J. ETH& SOC. PHIL., Jan. 2007, at 1–2; Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism
and Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271, 272–73 (2008).
230. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 229, at 274.
231. See, e.g., David France, The Science of Gaydar, N.Y. MAG., June 17,
2007, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/33520/.
ICS
ICS
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victim, someone to be harmed or wronged who has standing to
complain about the act by the perpetrator, even if prosecution
is done by ―the People.‖ Even in inchoate crimes, the State criminalizes an act that had a probability of harming someone,
even if that harm was not actually realized.232 By contrast, the
non-person-affecting principle approach would target actions
that harm no one; instead the evil is the failure to produce a potential population with less suffering or more opportunity, and
the argument is that these should not be the kinds of actions
for which I can be locked up or subject to bodily invasion, such
as forced sterilization. On this view criminal law is special in
that it expresses the approbation of the community and imposes a particular kind of sanction, all the more so when it targets
as private and personal an activity as reproduction.
Eric Rakowski captures the idea in part when he observes
that ―[t]he person-affecting restriction encapsulates an apparently attractive moral thesis: the only morally cognizable
harms or benefits are those to existing people.‖233 My thesis in
this Section is actually weaker: Even if these claims are morally cognizable they may not justify legal interventions that seek
to use criminal penalties or bodily integrity infringement to
limit reproduction. This is a kind of separate spheres view that
suggests that, while non-person-affecting goods may be worth
pursuing all things being equal, as legal matter they should not
be traded off against serious person-affecting harms that flow
from the criminalization of reproductive acts. Jan Narveson
quipped that, ―[W]e are in favor of making people happy, but
neutral about making happy people.‖234 Here the claim is that a
state may be more justified in adopting criminal law interventions to prevent harming people (who do exist or will certainly
exist) than to cause the production of people who have a welfare of X rather than a different set of people who would have a
higher welfare of Y.

232. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV.
141, 152 (2011) (explaining the practice of, and theory behind, preventative
criminalization).
233. Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1345, 1387 (2002). In fact, to be more precise we should probably amend Rakowski‘s last words from ―to existing people‖ to ―to existing people, and those
who will come into existence irrespective of our policy choice.‖
234. Jan Narveson, Moral Problems of Population, 57 MONIST 80 (1973).
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Why do I want to suggest that such regulation may be
beyond the moral limits of the criminal law? My argument begins with the view that interventions that seek to criminalize
conduct (or invade bodily integrity, but from here on I will just
speak of criminalization) require particularly persuasive justifications, and thus not every reason a state may have for
achieving an end will pass muster if this is the form of the intervention. This is a theme that has pervaded this Article, beginning with the taxonomy I introduced in Part I, and on its
own it does not seem terribly controversial. This might be
thought of as a limitation on the strength of the reason or as a
limitation on the type of the reason—not every type of reason
for acting counts as sufficient to justify the criminalization of
conduct.
The next step is to suggest that the non-person-affecting
principle approach—which argues for the creation of one potential population over another—is not as persuasive a reason for
criminalizing conduct as person-affecting arguments such as
the prevention of harm to already existing individuals (or to
those like Feinberg‘s kindergarteners who will exist irrespective of our policy choice). To be precise, we can identify at least
five possible positions as to the relationship between personaffecting and non-person-affecting harms/benefits, at least in
their ability to justify criminalizing reproductive acts: The first
is ―on par.‖ The two count equally such that we ought to be indifferent between an equally sized prevention of harm to existing individuals (the person-affecting harm) versus creating a
population that has the same size welfare differential over the
other possible population (I will call this the ―the non-personaffecting ‗harm‘‖ with ‗scare quotes‘ around ‗harm‘ to indicate
that it is not really harm in the usual sense but instead the difference in welfare between two potential populations). The
second possibility is ―non-person-affecting discounted,‖ in which
the prevention of non-person-affecting ‗harm‘ counts but not as
much (or in the same way) as the prevention of the same size
person-affecting harm. The third possibility is ―non-person affecting does not count,‖ in which we ignore non-person-affecting
‗harms‘ altogether, but count the prevention of person-affecting
harms. The last two possibilities, which I think can be rejected
fairly easily, flip the last two—―person-affecting discount‖ and
―person-affecting does not count‖ would discount or not count
the person-affecting harms, respectively.
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If ―on par‖ is correct then my claims in this subsection
should fail and non-person-affecting principles should count as
perfectly good reasons for criminalizing reproductive behavior,
though they still face the other challenges I have laid out in
this part. If by contrast ―non-person-affecting does not count‖ is
true, then my argument in this subsection fully succeeds. If
―non-person-affecting discounted‖ is true, the justifiability of
these interventions would depend on the size of the aggregated
person-affecting harms of this type (the set back of the interests of would-be reproducers whose liberty is curtailed) and the
size of the aggregated non-person-affecting ‗harm‘ prevention
accomplished by the intervention, and how much one discounts
the non-person-affecting ‗harm‘ in the calculus.
Why doubt ―on par‖? Begin with a thought experiment:
Imagine you saw that your seven year-old-son was about to be
hit by a car and would become a paraplegic. How much of your
own body would you risk if you knew you could get him out of
the way? Would you risk the same amount to produce a child
who had healthy use of his limbs rather than born a paraplegic,
or would you risk less? If the answer is that you would risk
less, on par seems to get it wrong just as a matter of how we
choose for ourselves, which is not even getting to the question of
what the State may permissibly force us to do through threat of
criminal sanction. This would suggest that preventing harm to
already-existing people of size 5 (to use an arbitrary number)
gets priority over creating future person X instead of Y where
the difference in their welfare is also 5.
Of course, as with all intuition pumps, we have to be cautious; it is possible what is really motivating this response is
concern for the additional trauma to ourselves of our child‘s losing something good like walking, rather than if the child never
had that ability to begin with, or the psychological bonding we
have to an existing child. It is unclear whether any amount of
introspection can help us sort this out, so let me try a less emotionally fraught thought experiment by adapting one Rakowski
has himself adapted from Parfit (although Rakowski uses it differently than I do):
There are two rare genetic conditions, A and B, which can be detected
only by special tests and which, by different routes, produce the same
serious disability in children. If a woman has condition A, she must
undergo medical treatment for at least one month prior to conception
to bear a non-disabled baby. Condition B afflicts children. If a child is
born with condition B, doctors can cure it during the second month of
an infant‘s life; after the window closes, no cure is possible.
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Suppose that the government has funds for only one of two medical programs. Program A would test millions of women who wished to
become pregnant. Those found to have condition A would be warned
to undergo treatment and to delay conception for at least one month,
until their treatment was complete. Program B would test millions of
infants. Those found to have condition B would be treated so that they
would develop normally.235

Suppose that the costs of running the two programs are
such that one program is just slightly cheaper and therefore
that implementing Program A would lead parents to substitute
1,003 children without disabilities for 1,003 children with disabilities—different children would come into existence—while
Program B would only cure the disability of 1,000 existing
children. On the ―on par‖ view we ought to always prefer Program A, for as Rakowski puts it ―how could we be morally compelled to choose a medical program that leads to more disabled
children?‖236 I, however, think that this is exactly the opposite
of what our intuitions would tell us—that many would favor
Program B because we should choose to prevent harm to existing individuals instead of pursuing the impersonal good by
bringing into existence new individuals with higher welfare,
individuals who will not be harmed if born with a disability for
the reasons identified by the Non-Identity Problem.
Perhaps you are not sure if you would choose Program A or
Program B. In that case, let me add an additional fact that may
help clarify your own views. Imagine I now tell you that while
Program B will cure 1,000 children already existing of the disability, that the screening offered by Program A, if put into practice now, will insure that 1,003 children will come into existence without the disability (as opposed to 1003 who would
have the disability) not now but ten generations from now. If
this makes you more likely to favor Program B, then that is an
additional reason to doubt the view that person and nonperson-affecting harms should be treated ―on par,‖ for the generational distance should be irrelevant for the non-personaffecting approach.237

235. Rakowski, supra note 233, at 1379.
236. Id. at 1381.
237. Again we must be wary of intuition pumps smuggling in other assumptions. If, for example, the reason why generational distance mattered to
you is that you are imagining that ten generations from now we will have developed other cures for disability or that our society would be more disabilityaccommodating, that might give you a reason to favor Program B independent
of whether ―on par‖ is true. I could tell you to assume away these facts and ask
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Indeed, to put the point most forcefully, ―on par‖ seems to
carry with it the counter-intuitive implication that if offered
the choice of devoting resources to curing or preventing a harm
to an already existing person versus devoting resources to produce a future person with an equivalent welfare differential, we
ought to be indifferent between harm-prevention and replacement.
Suppose these thought experiments have convinced you
that ―on par‖ is problematic. There are, nonetheless, two separate types of responses one might make to my claim that the
non-person-affecting principle approach may justify criminal
sanction on reproductive activities. The first response is that
my argument has only rejected ―on par‖ in a forced choice rationing setting. It does not necessarily follow that ―on par‖
ought to be rejected as a valid basis for the criminalization of
conduct in the reproductive setting. Here the person-affecting
harm we are allowing to occur is the setting back of the interests of the would-be parents in making the reproductive decisions the law tries to prevent (i.e., the regulation discussed in
Part II). The second response is that even if I have successfully
given an argument for rejecting ―on par‖ in the criminalization
of conduct, I have not rejected ―non-person-affecting discounted,‖ which would hold that that non-person affecting
‗harms‘ do not count the same as person-affecting ones, but
they do still count.
The first response might actually be helpful to my argument. While the State may face moral limits in rationing, they
are not nearly as strict as the moral limits of the criminal law.
Thus, if ―on par‖ is not convincing as a justification for rationing decisions, one might think it should a fortiori not be con-

whether your intuition remained, but one might wonder whether you really
banished those facts or merely thought you did. I accept this as a more general
problem with the intuition pump methodology—another reason why I offer
this critique of non-person-affecting principles more tentatively than the others—but I know of no other method to get at what we think the right answer
on this issue should be.
Some might instead appeal to future discounting, that illness is less bad
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur in the future even if we are not any
better equipped to deal with them. Whether to discount, and what to discount
is the subject to pervasive and complex disagreements among philosophers
and economists that I will not try to resolve here. For a good introduction for
legal academics, see generally Lewis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 79 (2007).
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vincing as a justification for imposing criminal law sanctions on
reproduction. In any event, in discussing the second response, I
shift to a thought experiment that actually uses criminal law
sanction rather than rationing.
The second response may or may not hurt my argument. If
non-person-affecting ‗harms‘ are discounted to a sufficient extent, then, in the cases discussed in Part II, whatever difference obtains between the welfare of the populations that would
come into existence with versus without the intervention once
discounted are unlikely to be significant enough to justify criminal restrictions on reproduction or bodily integrity violations.
In a way similar to my earlier discussion of imperfect NonIdentity Problems in Part III.B, how much of a discount factor
is required to reach that conclusion will vary with the weight
one gives to reproductive liberty; the more weight one gives reproductive liberty, the less discounting of non-person-affecting
‗harms‘ is needed to reach that conclusion. How much of a discount factor would be required also varies intervention-byintervention based on the size of the welfare difference between
the welfare of the populations that would come into existence.
While this is of course one of the most important aspects of any
critique of the viability of the non-person-affecting principle as
an alternative to BIRC type justifications, as with the discussion of lives not worth living in Part III.A, I think the welfare
difference due to the genetic abnormalities from incest is the
most plausible case where such a calculus might in the end
permit the criminal sanction, but the others seem far-off given
even very minimal discounting.
Now we could sidestep this need to determine the discount
factor and the other variables in the calculus altogether if we
could go further and actually rule out ―non-person-affecting
discounted‖ in favor of the stronger position that ―non-person
affecting does not count,‖ at least in the limited domain of justifying criminal sanction. Can one persuasively do so? One possible way is to employ a veil of ignorance device and ask whether
behind such a veil one would endorse a principle that allowed
the State to pursue non-person-affecting goods at the expense
of limitations on your reproductive liberty, of either the criminalization or bodily integrity type. Not knowing who you will be
in society, I ask you whether you would be willing to risk the
chance that it would be your reproductive desires the State will
stymie through criminalization (e.g., you are the single individual, the gay one, the individual over 50, etc.) not in order to
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prevent harm to existing people or people who will necessarily
exist in the future, but instead to ensure that population X
where children have less suffering and more opportunity comes
into existence sometime in the future, instead of population Y
who does not have these things.238 Once again, to really test
this intuition we should ask you whether you would agree to
this rule even if it meant criminalizing your reproductive conduct today to create a difference in population welfare that
would only manifest itself ten generations thereafter, since temporal distance should be irrelevant on the non-person-affecting
view. My own intuition in such a case is that I would not authorize the government to act in this way, whatever the size of
the non-person-affecting gain to be had, for the selfish reason
that there is nothing in it for me, only risk.
One might counter that this is not entirely true. It may be
the case that I am the person who comes into existence with
the higher rather than the lower welfare—but that seems to actually recapitulate the problematic reasoning of BIRC: the
choice is not higher-welfare me versus lower-welfare me, but
the welfare of person A versus the welfare of person B. And remember, no one is harmed if not brought into existence, so it is
not clear why I should care. If that is right, then non-personaffecting principles cannot justify criminal or bodily integrity
violative interventions on reproduction at all.
Of course, like all veil of ignorance type arguments, this
one is subject to variances in intuitions and critiques about
whether the veil is thick or thin enough in terms of the description of what the chooser knows.239 This is one reason why I am
238. One concern one might raise with this hypothetical is ―I would not
support the intervention even if it prevented the anticipated harm to an existing child.‖ For such a person I have made the case against these interventions
so forcefully that we need not get into this level of complexity, and I can take a
breather. Even this person, though, may encounter a harm-intervention pairing that they find justifies intervening if harm to existing children was prevented. As long as she can construct for herself one such case where she supports intervening to prevent harm to existing children but not to ensure an
equivalent welfare differential between bringing population Y rather than X
into existence, she has rejected on par and can continue reading this discussion using that example in her head.
239. Indeed, Parfit has suggested that these veil methods are not useful
when they require imagining not coming into existence as one of the possibilities, that while ―we can imagine a different possible history, in which we never
existed . . . we cannot assume that, in the actual history of the world, it might
be true that we never exist and thus we cannot ask what, on this assumption,
it would be rational to choose.‖ PARFIT, supra note 32, at 392. Of course, Par-
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more tentative about this critique of the non-person-affecting
principle approach than the others discussed. While I think I
have clearly made the case for at least discounting non-personaffecting principles as reasons for criminalizing reproductive
conduct of the type discussed in Part II, the case for ruling
these reasons out altogether is less certain.
To be clear, the discussion in this subsection has been directed towards a particular means of regulating reproduction
that require exceedingly compelling justifications: Those that
criminalize reproductive conduct or invade bodily integrity. Excluding (or at least discounting) non-person-affecting principles
as justifications for these interventions need not mean one has
to do the same as to all the possible interventions in the taxonomy developed in Part I. This is just to re-iterate the prior
point that there are moral limits to the criminal law or the invasion of bodily integrity that are not present as to other forms
of state action.240
Thus, it seems to me that for informational interventions
the State might more justifiably adopt a non-person-affecting
principle as support. Although it would not be a pithy billboard,
it does not seem particularly problematic for the State to urge
people as part of abstinence education that ―waiting until you
are older results in less suffering and less limited opportunity
in the world and is thus good (in an impersonal sense).‖ Selective funding of assisted reproduction is somewhat closer but
may also be potentially justifiable on non-person-affecting principles since if the State has no obligation to fund X (and especially if it is rationing funding), it does not seem objectionable
for it to choose to fund only instances of X that do not involve
creating individuals who experience more suffering or limited
opportunity, at least when the reproducers could have done
otherwise.241 Selectively invalidating contracts or assigning pafit‘s own thought experiments require imagining all sorts of odd things (like
having half one‘s brain put in one person and half in another), so one might
beg to differ with him on how far imagination can stretch.
240. This concession parallels one Feinberg makes as to his rejection of Legal Moralism, that harmless immoralities might properly be targeted through
subsidies or educational programs promoting a particular vision of the good
life, just not criminal prohibition. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 312–13 (1984) (harmless immoralities might properly be targeted through subsidies or educational programs
promoting a particular vision of the good life, just not criminal prohibition).
241. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 14, at 500–09 (discussing whether the
State has an obligation to fund reproductive technologies).
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rental status in order to serve non-person-affecting goals seems
to fall somewhere in between, although my own sense is that
they should fall closer to the impermissible use of criminal
sanction because of their serious negative liberty consequences,
but that is an argument to be fleshed out for another day.
To be sure, I think this claim about the relationship of nonperson-affecting principles and the moral limits of the criminal
law is more controversial. Although I find it convincing on its
own terms, even without it, I believe the other arguments I
have offered above sufficiently favor rejecting the non-personaffecting principle approach as an adequate reformulation of
BIRC that can justify the interventions discussed in Part II.
D. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Whether the interventions discussed Part II are normatively justified by BIRC or its reformulations is a distinct question
from whether those justifications are constitutionally sufficient
as a doctrinal matter under U.S. law. My analysis has focused
on the former, but I want to make a few brief and tentative
suggestions regarding implications for the constitutional question.
As I and others have elsewhere suggested, the level of
scrutiny (rational basis, strict scrutiny, or something intermediate like the ―undue burden‖ standard from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey)242 under which the
kinds of regulations of reproduction I have been discussing
would be judged (especially those involving reproductive technologies) is underdetermined by the existing case law. The only
U.S. Supreme Court decision to consider whether there is a
fundamental right to become a genetic parent, Skinner v. Oklahoma—finding a fundamental right that was violated by
physical sterilization of individuals convicted three or more
times of crimes of moral turpitude but not for embezzlement—
is subject to a myriad of possible interpretations, especially as
applied to reproductive technologies.243 That uncertainty is
242. 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992).
243. 316 U.S. 535, 536–39 (1942); see, e.g., VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR-TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN
EUGENICS 165 (2008) (concluding that ―both liberals and conservatives have
made a mistake‖ in their reading of Skinner because the case was ―neither argued nor decided as a case about rights in the sense that we use the term ‗fundamental right‘ today‖); CARL WELLMAN, MEDICAL LAW AND MORAL RIGHTS
145– 46 (2005) (reading Skinner as limited to marriage); Cohen, Genetic Par-
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compounded by other unresolved substantive Due Process debates: the debate between those adopting an ―intimacy‖ versus
―Due Process traditionalist‖ approach to substantive due
process;244 the debate over the level of generality with which we
characterize the right at issue245 —it is easier to find a fundamental ―right to procreate‖ writ large grounded in Skinner and
historical analogues than a ―right to use an anonymous sperm
donor‖; and uncertainty whether new fundamental rights
claims that build off existing decisions (Skinner in this case)
will be ‗grandfathered‘ in or instead revisited under the more
traditionalist approach. Further complicating the question is
that while cases of the denial of services based on age, marital
status, and sexuality ordinarily only merit rational basis review when discrimination against these categories of persons is
alleged, it is also possible that, when combined with the increased substantive due process protection of procreative activities, heightened scrutiny (of the intermediate or strict variety)
may be warranted in these cases as a matter of equal protection (one reading of what happened in Skinner itself).246
A full analysis would have to consider BIRC and each of its
reformulations under each possible tier of scrutiny. I hope to
undertake that fuller analysis on another occasion, but here I
examine the matter only through the prism of rational basis,
and focus on BIRC itself. Interventions that fail rational basis
will a fortiori fail heightened scrutiny. Moreover, if strict scrutiny was the appropriate review, many of these interventions
would also have problems more directly related to the underinclusivity problem I sketched above. That is, because there are
many cases where under BIRC or its reformulations there are
comparable probabilities and severity of deficits to children

ent, supra note 5, at 1148–67; Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative
Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. DEV. L.J. 1, 44 (2007) (reading Skinner as protecting only a right to ―self-replace‖ and thus a fundamental right to only one or
two children per couple).
244. See, e.g., Cohen, Constitution, supra note 5, at 1159–60; Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543 (2008). Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (intimacy) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79
(2003) (intimacy), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21, 727
(1997) (due process traditionalism).
245. Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–22, and Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (narrow), with Michael H. 491 U.S. at 139
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (expansive).
246. See Rao, supra note 83, at 1474 –88 (discussing Equal Protection challenges for denials of access to reproductive technology).
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where the State has not acted in similar ways (including those
involving coital reproduction), a court is unlikely to find these
interventions as ―narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest‖ under strict scrutiny, just as the Skinner
Court found that Oklahoma‘s distinction between sterilization
of ―those who [had] thrice committed grand larceny‖ and those
who had thrice embezzled was constitutionally problematic.247
While the State might argue that the difficulties it would face
in its ability to enforce the rule on the natural reproduction
side is sufficient to distinguish the two cases, it is far from clear
that this is a winning argument.
Even under rational basis review‘s very deferential standard requiring only that the statute bear ―a reasonable relation
to a legitimate state interest,‖248 BIRC justifications should fail
for perfect Non-Identity Problem cases because no one is
harmed such that this justification is irrational. BIRC justifications for perfect Non-Identity problems will therefore, a fortiori,
fail intermediate and strict scrutiny. By contrast, in the imperfect cases the statutes are likely to survive rational basis review
because so long as ―any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify‖ a legislative enactment, it satisfies that scrutiny.249 A small enough probability of harm to a small enough
population of resulting children (especially if the harm itself is
small) might make the intervention actually irrational given
the burden it places on a much larger population. But the question under this review is whether a legislature could conceivably have estimated the probability, population size affected,
and harm severity in such a way that the intervention was rational. Given the usual deference, I think the answer is yes,
and thus there is an important divergence from the normative
analysis that I have argued should treat perfect and imperfect
cases more alike.
247. By contrast, if rational basis review applies the failure of the State to
go after all similar is unproblematic, in that the Court has permitted legislation to conclude that ―[e]vils in the same field may be of different dimensions
and proportions, requiring different remedies . . . [o]r the reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind . . . [or t]he legislature may select one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others‖. Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
248. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722; see also Robertson, supra note 86, at
347 (making a similar point for denials of access to reproductive technologies
for LGBT populations).
249. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1960).
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A similar logic might apply to a justification that these interventions prevent lives not worth living, but first there is a
threshold question of whether preventing lives not worth living
is a legitimate state interest. While I have suggested that it is
implausible that any of the interventions discussed in Part II
actually prevent lives not worth living, on rational basis review
all a court must determine to sustain the intervention is that
the legislature could rationally have reached that conclusion.
Thus, the kinds of uncertainty evinced by courts in wrongful
life cases as to whether a particular condition produces a life
not worth living is not an obstacle; here, the courts would be
deferring to a hypothetical legislative judgment on the matter
and their own uncertainty might cut in favor of that deference.
Except perhaps for the incest case, I think in the rest of these
cases a claim by the State that ―children born to single parents
will have lives not worth living‖ seems likely to exceed even the
extreme deference given to legislatures under rational basis review. In any event, for political reasons, I think it unlikely that
governments would defend statutes on this theory in most of
the examples I have discussed.
It is unclear whether the pursuit of non-person-affecting
principles approach constitutes a legitimate (or for that matter
compelling) state interest. Preventing significant externalized
costs from reproduction might be such an interest, but this approach represents the State‘s interest in the nature of the population that comes into existence in the future that is unconnected to the externalities different possible populations of
future persons might impose on already-existing individuals or
the state. As Phillip Peters has put the matter there is an ―unanswered question [of] whether the courts will be skeptical of
state laws prohibiting conduct that does not make any specific
individual worse off.‖250 His most specific argument in favor of
the constitutionality of this approach (to be fair, delivered in a
very short paragraph in a twelve-page book chapter) is to rely
on the presumed constitutionality of incest laws,251 but it is this
very example that my work seeks to question, and as I have
shown in Part II most of the courts that have passed on its constitutionality have relied on the (I hope) now-discredited BIRC
justification. There are also further questions of whether the
limitation to same-number cases is a constitutional limitation.
250. Peters, supra note 199, at 323.
251. Id. at 329.
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Again I emphasize the tentative and brief nature of this
analysis: it does not consider intermediate standards of review,
nor have I pressed on how differences between the kinds of
means used to regulate reproduction might interface with the
justifications in a constitutional sense.252 My goal here has
been to start a conversation about the way in which the normative and constitutional analyses are in some places symmetrical
and in others divergent. There is much more to be said, and I
hope to say it in further work. At the very least, though, my account renders problematic the claims of Radhika Rao, Marsha
Garrison, and others on the presumed constitutionally of BIRCjustified regulations of reproduction and the suggestion it flows
ineluctably from the constitutionality of similar regulation of
adoption.253
CONCLUSION—BEYOND BEST INTERESTS
In this Article I have shown a deep tendency for courts, legislatures, and scholars to appeal to a particular kind of justification for interventions that influence when, whether, and with
whom we reproduce: Best Interests of the Resulting Child
(BIRC). I have shown that the Non-Identity Problem makes
this form of justification problematic, and that this parallels
the existing rejection of wrongful life tort liability. Nevertheless, I have suggested that appeals to BIRC reasoning remain
pervasive, reflecting the transposition of settled family law and
the political theory advantages of adopting a Millian Harm
Principle justification for protecting vulnerable populations.
I have also considered three attempts to save the BIRC
view by reformulating it. The first would expand the category of
lives not worth living; the second would accept BIRC reasoning
but limit it to the imperfect Non-Identity Problem cases discussed in Part II; the third would replace it with a non-personaffecting principle justification which claims that the wrongfulness of the parental action stems from the failure to substitute
a child who would experience less suffering or more opportuni-

252. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1234 – 40 (1996) (suggesting that in its free speech, free
exercise, and abortion jurisprudence that for incidental infringements of
would-be fundamental rights, the Court has at times applied a substantiality
threshold).
253. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 100, at 1626, 1642; Rao, supra note 83,
at 1477.

518

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:423

ty. I have provided reasons why I think each faces problems
that make it unworkable.
Where do we go from here? We have two options: the first
is to accept that these interventions are unjustified. The second
is to drop the fig leaf of BIRC and delve into the ―secret ambition‖ of best interests arguments pertaining to regulating reproduction. I believe there are three families of potential
frameworks that might still sustain the interventions described
in Part II, but accepting any of them requires a move away
from the comfortable, overlapping consensus between comprehensive moral theories that BIRC arguments pretend to offer,
and instead requires adopting more controversial premises. I
develop these approaches and offer critiques in a companion article.254 Here I merely want to sketch the three possibilities:
Reproductive Externalities: The Non-Identity Problem
is an obstacle for any attempt to justify state intervention by
claiming that the child who would be produced absent the intervention is harmed. What I call the ―reproductive externalities‖ approach sidesteps the Non-Identity Problem by specifying a different victim of the harm: third-parties may be harmed
by this child‟s existence. These externalities may be intrafamilial or more domain-general ideas about costs to the State
through disability accommodation, diminished earnings, etc.
These costs are most tangible as to cases involving the creation
of children with disabilities, for example the genetic abnormalities stemming from brother-sister incest.
Wronging While Overall Benefiting: This possibility
can be understood as shifting the criteria for moral wrongfulness from harm to a conception of wrong absent harm or as offering a conception of harm where the fact that an individual is
overall benefited is insufficient to save the act from being
wrongful.
In the wrongful life context, Seanna Shiffrin has developed
the most fully fleshed out version tied to legal application,255
but other versions of this approach also exist.256 On Shiffrin‘s
account, with its non-comparative conception of harm and ben-

254. Cohen, supra note 9.
255. Shiffrin, supra note 33, at 119–20.
256. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32, at 12; Dillard, supra note 60, at 1131
n.48; Elizabeth Harman, Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?, 18 PHIL.
PERSP. 89, 93 (2004); F.M. Kamm, Baselines and Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1367, 1385 (2003); Woodward, supra note 32, at 810.
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efit, in creating a child we both harm and benefit the child at
once, and it is wrongful to impose upon a child an unconsentedto harm merely to confer upon him a ―pure benefit‖ like existence rather than to remove or prevent a greater harm.257
Legal Moralism and Virtue Ethics: A third alternative
is what Joel Feinberg called legal moralism in the narrow
sense—the use of criminal law to deter acts which neither
harm nor offend but undermine public morality.258 A related
approach draws on virtue ethics conceptions, which suggest
that the character of the agent doing the action is what is central in determining its wrongfulness.259 Michael Sandel‘s work
on an opposite issue, the morality of enhancement, might be
thought of as one model of where a virtue ethics argument
might go.260 Both of these approaches side-step the NonIdentity Problem because they do not depend on a claim that
the child is harmed by the reproductive act, rather that society
or the agent reproducing is, in a way that should motivate state
action.
As I suggest in a companion article coming out in another
Issue of this Journal, each of these options faces some serious
normative and constitutional difficulties as justifications for
the interventions I have discussed in Part II. Would it be better
to adopt one (or more) of these alternative possibilities or instead to simply reject these interventions? A full evaluation of
that question is (in this case quite literally) a matter I leave for
another paper. Here my goal has been instead to show that the
way courts, legislatures, and scholars discuss the regulation of
reproduction is deeply flawed, and cannot be saved.

257.
258.
259.
(2006);

Shiffrin, supra note 33, at 120–27.
See FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 24; FEINBERG, supra note 240, at 3– 4.
Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 65–76
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